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This paper examines how the use of ‘authorized-generics’ (AGs) influences Canadian 
prescription drug prices.  An authorized-generic is the actual brand name drug product, 
manufactured by the brand firm, but sold as a generic by a licensee or subsidiary of the brand, 
competing with independent generics (IGs), which operate independently from the brand firm.  
In theory, AGs have offsetting effects on drug prices.  On the one hand, AGs compete against 
IGs and increases in the number of generic competitors should lower prices.  On the other hand, 
the threat of AG entry into a therapeutic market might deter entry by IGs and this would lessen 
competition.  Moreover, brand firms might increase prices of their brand drugs to increase 
demand for their AG.  I find that when AGs are first to enter a drug market, average drug prices 
drop by about 12%; average prices drop by smaller amounts, the larger the AG share of the 
generic market.  I could not directly assess whether the threat of AG entry into a market might 
deter entry by IGs.  IG executives, however, state that the threat of AG entry has decreased their 
incentive to challenge ‘marginal’ drug markets.  In particular the threat of AG entry has 
increased from $5m to $10m the threshold market size – the value of brand drug sales in the 10
th 
year that it has been on the market, below which the IG firm will not attempt to enter.  IG 
executives also stated that AGs have seriously reduced IG retained earnings.  The reduction in 
retained earnings has hampered their ability to challenge brand drugs with annual sales well 
above $10m, but which have particularly high entry costs.   Finally, the IG executives claimed 
that brand firms have attempted to use the threat of AG entry to negotiate agreements with the IG 
to delay entry (or not enter at all).  A comprehensive evaluation of the competitive effects of 
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Résumé 
Cette étude se penche sur les effets de l’usage de médicaments « génériques autorisés » (GAs) 
sur le prix des prescriptions canadiennes. Un GA est un produit de marque original vendu 
comme un médicament  générique par un tiers parti autorisé ou une filiale de la marque, rentrant 
en concurrence avec les produits génériques indépendants (GIs), et qui opère ainsi 
indépendamment de la compagnie mère. En théorie, les GAs ont des effets compensateurs sur le 
prix des prescriptions. D’un côté, les GAs rentrent en concurrence avec les GIs et la hausse du 
nombre de producteurs de médicaments génériques devrait entraîner une diminution des prix. 
D’un autre côté, la menace liée à l’introduction des GAs sur le marché thérapeutique pourrait 
décourager l’entrée de nouveaux GIs, et provoquer une baisse de la concurrence. De plus, les 
marques pourraient augmenter les prix de leurs médicaments originaux afin d’augmenter la 
demande des GAs. Nous trouvons qu’à la suite de l’introduction des AGs sur le marché, le prix 
moyens des médicaments diminuent de 12%; mais ces derniers diminuent plus modérément 
selon l’importance de la part de marché des GAs sur le marché des médicaments génériques. 
Nous n’avons pas été capable de déterminer directement si la menace posée par l’introduction 
des GAs sur un marché décourageait l’entrée de nouveaux GIs. Les cadres de compagnies de 
GIs, cependant, affirment que la menace de voir apparaître des GAs a diminué volonté de rentrer 
sur des marchés de médicaments plus marginaux. En particulier, l’apparition des GAs a entraîné 
une hausse de $5m à $10m du seuil critique de taille du marché – la valeur des ventes d’un 
médicament de marque durant la dixième année de sa mise en marché, seuil en dessous duquel 
une compagnie de GI ne tentera pas de pénétrer le marché. Les cadres des compagnies de GIs ont 
aussi souligné que les GAs ont sérieusement réduit leurs bénéfices non distribués. Cette 
réduction des revenus stables a entravé leur aptitude à compétitionner avec les médicaments de 
marque  dont les ventes sont supérieures à $10m, mais dont les coûts d’introduction sont 
particulièrement élevés. Enfin, les cadres des compagnies de GIs soutiennent que les compagnies 
de marque ont tenté d’utiliser la menace d’introduire des GAs pour négocier des délais (ou des 
retraits) d’introduction avec les GIs. Une évaluation complète des effets compétitifs des GAs 
devrait vérifier et quantifier ces coûts et les comparer aux bénéfices de la concurrence émanant 
des GAs. 
   3
Introduction 
 
This paper examines how the use of ‘authorized-generics’ influences Canadian prescription drug 
prices.  An authorized-generic (hereafter ‘AG’)
1 is “the actual brand name drug product, 
manufactured by the brand company, but sold as a generic by a licensee or subsidiary of the 
brand, competing with independent generics.” (Hollis and Liang, 2006)  AGs are to be 
distinguished from independent generics (hereafter ‘IG’s) which operate independently from the 
brand firm. 
 
Theoretically, AGs have offsetting effects on drug prices.  On the one hand, AGs compete 
against IGs and as I discuss below, increases in the number of generic competitors should lower 
prices.  On the other hand, as Hollis (2003) and Kong and Selden (2004) have noted, the threat of 
AG entry into a therapeutic market might deter entry by IGs and this would lessen competition.  
Moreover, brand firms might increase prices of their brand drugs to increase demand for their 
AG if there are no IGs available.     
 
Why might the threat of AG entry deter entry by an IG?  According to Hollis (2002), the reason 
is that the AG, should it be the first generic to enter a market, typically captures a significant and 
durable market share.  This reduces the demand for the IG and may make entry into marginally 
profitable therapeutic markets unprofitable.  One would therefore expect that the threat of AG 
entry might deter IG entry in markets with only modest revenue potential.   
 
Generic drug competition in the Canadian drug market 
 
How does generic drug competition lower drug prices?  In a conventional market, increases in 
the number of suppliers reduce the average price paid by consumers – suppliers lower prices in 
an attempt to gain market share.  In the limiting case, known as a perfectly competitive market 
(one with very many buyers and sellers of a homogenous product), price will decline to the 
marginal production cost.  The Canadian market for generic prescription drugs is different.  First, 
two generic companies, Apotex and Novopharm, control over half of the market (Skinner 2004).  
Second, although there are many consumers in this market, including private insurance plans and 
cash paying customers, the market is dominated by several large provincial government drug 
plans, notably the plans operating in Ontario (the Ontario Drug Benefit program) and Quebec 
(RAMQ) that cover the drug costs incurred by seniors, those with high drug costs relative to 
income, and other groups.  The ODB plan is the single largest drug plan in Canada; it dictates the 
amount that it is willing to pay for generic drugs, and these prices become the defacto prices 
charged to other customers.   
 
The amount that is ODB willing to pay for generic drugs is a proportion of brand drug prices.  
During the period May 1993 – September 1998, ODB invoked the ‘75/90’ regulations.  The 
75/90 regulations stipulated that the first generic entrants’ price could not exceed 75% of the 
incumbent branded drug price.  When the second generic entered the market, the maximum 
reimbursement price dropped to 67.5% of the branded drug price (i.e. 75% of the first generic 
entrants price: 75% of 90%=67.5%).  During the period November 1998 – September 2006, 
                                                 
1 Authorized-generics are sometimes referred to as ‘pseudo-generics’.   4
ODB limited the first generic entrants’ price to 70% of the incumbent branded drug price.  When 
the second generic entered the market, the maximum reimbursement price dropped to 63% of the 
branded drug price (i.e. 70% of the first generic entrants price: 70% of 90%=63%).  Since 
October 2006, the ODB reimbursement of generic drugs is limited to 50% of the brand drug 
price.  The ODB, however, will consider a increasing the reimbursement of the first generic 
entrant by up to 70%, on a case-by-case basis.   
 
Anis et al (2003) present evidence that generic prices in Ontario are set close to the ODB 
maximum generic drug reimbursement prices.  The prices charged for generic drugs in other 
provinces tend to match ODB prices.  Generic firms that attempt to charge more would soon be 
undercut by wholesalers who sell drugs at ODB prices.  
 
How then do generic firms compete for market share?  Once they become available for sale, 
generic drugs rapidly replace branded drugs owing to the reimbursement policies of almost all 
drug plans, public and private alike.  Most plans limit reimbursement of multi-sourced drugs (i.e. 
drugs for which there are both brand and generic forms available for sale) to the price of the 
generic drug.
2  Drug plan beneficiaries do have the option of paying extra to get the higher priced 
brand version of the drug, but relatively few are willing to pay extra.  The first generic therefore 
gains a large market share and can charge 70% of the branded drug price.  Once there are several 
generics available, generic firms compete for sales to large pharmacy chains such as the 
Shoppers Drug Mart chain and independent pharmacies by lowering prices charged to these 
pharmacies.  Competition occurs through the generosity of cash and in-kind rebates; these 
rebates drive down the effective price paid by the pharmacy for generic drugs.  The difference 
between the ODB reimbursement price and the pharmacy’s actual acquisition cost becomes part 
of the pharmacy’s revenues.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that this margin can be as high as 60% 
of the formulary price of generic drugs.  Anis (1992) reports that when the Nova Scotia public 
drug plan replaced formulary pricing with a system in which only the actual acquisition costs 
were reimbursed, generic drug prices fell by about 40%. 
 
The rebate system was disrupted by regulations enacted by ODB in October 2006.  In an attempt 
to manage program costs, ODB appropriated some of the rebate amounts that were accruing to 
pharmacy chains.  It did so by reducing the maximum that it would reimburse generic drugs to 
50% of the brand drug price and limiting the rebate amounts generic firms paid to pharmacies for 
ODB-reimbursed drugs to 20% of the ODB reimbursement price.
3  Although ODB did not 
regulate rebates paid for drugs that it did not reimburse, it applied a code of conduct that required 
that all generic drug rebates that Ontario pharmacies received (from sales of generic drugs to 
both ODB and private payers) be used for patient care.  Rebates could no longer be taken as 
                                                 
2 The Quebec RAMQ plan is notable for its willingness to pay for the brand version of the drug for 
15 years (from the date of formulary inclusion of the brand drug) even if generic versions are 
available for sale. 
3 To offset these revenue losses, the Ontario government increased the dispensing fee (from 
$6.46 to $7.00 per prescription) and, in recognition of professional services traditionally rendered 
by community pharmacists without payment, established new funding (cited to be in the area 
of $50 million for 2006-07) as compensation for these services.  Further details on the legislation 
are available at: 
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/public/legislation/drugs/hu_drugsact.html    5
personal income.  These regulations appear to be actively enforced: ODB just recently 
announced that each Ontario pharmacy is required to submit quarterly reports on the amount of 
rebate revenue received and how these revenues are used.   
 
It is unclear how these regulations will affect the prices received by generic firms.  On the one 
hand, the maximum rebate that can be paid on ODB prescriptions is limited to 20% of the ODB 
price – limiting the rebates should increase prices received by generics.  On the other hand, this 
limit does not apply to non-ODB prescriptions, so that generics might still use rebates to compete 
for this segment of the Ontario market, as well as the rest of the domestic market.  Moreover, the 
maximum generic price is now 50% of the brand price (although as stated earlier, it is possible 
that the first generic entrant might be able to negotiate a higher amount).  It seems likely that that 
this new, lower generic price will be available to the rest of the domestic market, although 
pharmacy chains are actively resisting this at present.  
 
Why might a brand firm introduce an AG? 
 
Under the terms of the ‘NOC-link’ section of the Patent Act, IG firms must declare to the brand 
firm their intention of introducing a generic copy onto the market.
4  This declaration, and any 
resulting litigation over the validity of brand firm’s patents, gives the brand firm some indication 
of the timing of IGs onto the market.  If no IG is expected to enter, then neither will the AG.  If it 
appears that IG entry is likely, then the brand firm may launch an AG, for two reasons.   
 
First, launching an AG might be profitable.  Relative to IG firms, the brand firm faces low fixed 
market entry costs.  Because the AG is the brand drug, the brand firm does not face the costs of 
conducting bioequivalence studies,
5 nor does it face the costs of challenging the validity of any 
outstanding patents.  Also, the costs of establishing manufacturing capacity have already been 
incurred at the time of the brand drug launch.  The brand firm must pay a fee for the licensee to 
sell the AG drug, but these costs would likely be less than the fixed costs incurred by IG firms. 
 
Should it decide to enter a market, the brand firm is faced with the decision of launching its AG 
before the IG drug, or not.  By launching before the IG, the AG initially captures the entire share 
of the generics market.  Moreover, if it is the only generic available on the market, it need not 
pay pharmacies any rebate (since the pharmacy has no choice but to carry it) and this will 
increase net reimbursement.  These benefits may be short lived however – as the number of 
generic competitors increase, the AG’s market share will decrease and the amount of rebate 
needed to gain access to pharmacy shelves increases.
6  More importantly, by launching before 
                                                 
4 IG firms must declare using a ‘Notice of Allegation’ or NOA that their generic drug will not 
infringe any of the brand firm’s patents but this has the effect of signaling their intentions to enter 
a therapeutic market.  A brand firm can delay the regulatory approval of the generic drug 
(technically the issuance by Health Canada of a Notice of Compliance, or NOC, indicating that 
the drug is bioequivalent to the brand drug) by alleging patent infringement. 
5 Health Canada requires evidence that IGs are bio-equivalent with the brand drug and also 
have acceptable potency, purity, and stability.  Hollis (2005) cites a newspaper article that 
indicates that these development and clinical testing costs typically range from $0.5 m to $3 m 
per drug. 
6 One way that a major IG firm is reported to have gained AG’s market share is to purchase from 
pharmacies the AG’s inventory, replacing it with their own product.    6
the IG, it will cannibalize its brand drug sales.  Specifically, during the period November 1998 – 
September 2006, the AG realized only 70% of the price paid for the brand version of the drug.  
Accepting a 30% price cut (and after the recent changes to ODB reimbursement, up to a 50% 
price cut) makes sense only if the AG realizes a compensatory increase in market share relative 
to the share it would realize if it launched alongside (or after) the IG.   
 
Launching an AG before the IG could increase profits for another reason.  If the AG is the only 
generic on the market then the brand firm could potentially coordinate the prices charged for the 
brand and AG forms of the drug in a way that maximizes profits.  In particular, as Hollis (2005) 
notes, by pricing the brand version relatively high, it can increase the amount that it charges for 
the AG version of the drug, subject to price regulations imposed by the federal government and 
provincial drug plans. 
 
The second reason that the brand firm might find it in their interest to launch an AG is to 
establish a reputation among IGs that it will launch an AG in ‘marginally profitable’ markets – 
markets in which the presence of the AG can tip the balance between economic profitability and 





In theory, the impact of AGs on drug prices is ambiguous.  What does the evidence indicate?  
There is no empirical evidence on the effects of AGs on the decision by an IG to attempt to enter 
a drug market.  The evidence on the effect of AGs on drug markets in which IGs do enter is 
mixed.  The one Canadian study (Hollis, 2005) found AGs to be mildly anti-competitive.  Hollis 
analyzed sales data for the 31 drugs in Canada for which the first generic competitor entered 
during the years 1994-1997.  He concludes: 
 
“This paper shows that pseudogenerics appear to increase both brand and generic drug prices, in 
line with a simple theoretical model.  … The econometric analysis shows that a 10% increase in 
the pseudogeneric share of generic sales leads to brand prices about 1% higher, controlling for 
the number of generics and the years since the first generic entered.  Since the typical pseudo-
generic controls about 40% of generic sales in the first few years of generic entry, this implies 
about a 4% increase in brand prices, compared to the case of no pseudo-generic. The direct 
impact of pseudo-generics on generic drug prices appears to be similar in scale.” Page 348. 
 
The US evidence is mixed.  The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
(PhRMA), the association of US brand drug firms, commissioned IMS Consulting to assess the 
effects of AGs on US generic prices.  The study
7 found that AGs were pro-competitive.  
Specifically the study compared markets with and without AGs present and found that average 
                                                 
7 The study is available at: 
http://www.phrma.org/files/IMS%20Authorized%20Generics%20Report_6-22-06.pdf [accessed 
Nov. 23, 2006]  See also: 
http://www.phrma.org/news_room/press_releases/phrma_statement_on_authorized_generics/ 
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generic prices (measured as a fraction of the brand drug price) were lower– on average 15.8 
percentage points lower – in markets with AGs present. 
 
In response, the Generic Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (GPhRMA), 
the association of US independent generic firms, commissioned Hollis and Liang to evaluate the 
PhRMA study methods.  The study, which will appear in Hollis and Liang (2006), challenged 
both the measurement of the price variables in the PhRMA study as well as the methods used to 
identify the impact of AGs on price.  For instance, Hollis and Liang suggested that the PhRMA 
study finding of greater percentage discounts to brand prices in markets with AGs is due in part 
to higher brand prices in markets with AGs, rather than lower generic prices.  In other words, 
during the period immediately following IG entry, prices of the brand drug increased more in 
markets with AGs than in markets without AGs.  They also question whether the influence of 
AGs on prices can be captured with a simple comparison of markets with and without AGs 
present.  In particular, they note that these market likely also differ with respect to sales volume, 
number of anticipated entrants, potential for licensing and other factors that could independently 
affect price discounts.  Finally, Hollis and Liang note that the PhRMA study does not address the 
effects of potential AG entry on the likelihood that an IG will attempt to enter a market. 
 
When they reanalyzed the data used in the PhRMA study, Hollis and Liang found some evidence 
of a very modest anti-competitive effect.  Specifically, in markets with AGs present, the average 






Industry Canada and the Competition Bureau asked me to investigate the following questions 
about the prevalence and effects of AGs in Canadian pharmaceutical drug markets: 
 
1.  In what proportion of drug markets are authorized generics present?   
 
2.  How important is the invocation of the automatic 24 month stay under the PM(NOC) 
Regulations in determining the entry of authorized generics? 
 
3.  What are the characteristics of the drug markets that authorized generics enter?  In 
particular, how important is market size in explaining authorized generic entry? 
 
4.  What is the impact of authorized generics on drug prices and the entry of independent 
generics?  
 
5.  How important are market opportunities in the U.S. at explaining the decisions of 
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Questions (ii) and (v) were addressed using qualitative methods – I interviewed executives of 
major brand and generic firms as well as representatives of the IG trade association, the 
Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association (CGPA).   
   
The remaining questions were addressed by analysing IMS Health Canada data on the national, 
monthly sales of the generic and brand versions of all dosage forms and strengths of the 
molecules in which the first generic drug (authorized or independent) launched over the period 
1998-2004.  I identified the AG drugs using the NOC database produced by Health Canada.
8  
Specifically AG drugs were identified as those generic drugs which have received New Drug 
Submission (NDS) status; independent generics have Abbreviated New Drug Submission 
(ANDS) status.
9  Not all NDS status generic drugs are AGs, however.  I consulted with IMS 
Health Canada, Jack Kay of Apotex and Brogan Inc to help identify the NDS drugs that were not 
AGs. 
 
Using these data, I determined the proportion of drug markets in which an AG has entered 
(question (i)); estimated regression models of the probability of AG entry in the molecule market 
(question (iii)); and finally estimated regression models of the average price for the molecule as a 
function of the presence of an AG (question (iv)).   
 
The probability of AG entry was modelled to be a function of inter alia an estimate of the 
expected total sales revenue for all dosage forms and strengths of the molecule in the year before 
the launch of the first generic; indicators of year of first generic launch; and finally indicators of 
the company producing the brand drug. 
 





1.  In what proportion of drug markets are authorized generics present?   
 
I defined a drug market as a unique combination of molecule and dosage form; hence I 
distinguished, for instance, the oral solid version of cyclosporine from its oral liquid and its 
injectable forms.  I distinguished between the different dosage forms of the same molecule 
because in some cases the pattern of generic drug entry varied by dosage form.  In the case of 
cyclosporine, for instance, an AG (but not an IG) launched an oral solid, while an IG (but not an 
AG) launched an oral liquid.  Neither an AG nor an IG launched an injectable form.  Of the 83 
drugs in the sample, however, most were oral solids (tablets and capsules) that were not available 
in other dosage forms.  
 
Table 1 provides a cross-tabulation of IG and AG entry into the 83 drug markets.  An AG 
entered 32 (39%) of the 83 drug markets in the sample, while an IG entered 74 of the 83 markets.  
                                                 
8 http://www.nocdatabase.ca/ 
9 According to Jack Kay, COO of Apotex, an AG drug would not cite any bioequivalence data on its product 
monograph, whereas an IG would.  Unfortunately, I could not locate the product monographs of the generic drugs in 
this study.   9
Both an IG and an AG entered in 31 markets.  The 39% AG entry rate over this time period is 
consistent with Hollis’ (2005) finding: “In 1999, the total pharmacy sales of these generics drugs 
totaled approximately $500m, of which the pseudo-generic share was 34.6%.” (p. 332)  
 
Table 1:  Cross tabulation of AG and IG entry in 83 drug markets 
 
     =1 if | 
authorized |   =1 if independent 
   generic |   generic launched 
  launched |         0          1 |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
         0 |         8         43 |        51  
           |     15.69      84.31 |    100.00  
           |     88.89      58.11 |     61.45  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
         1 |         1         31 |        32  
           |      3.13      96.88 |    100.00  
           |     11.11      41.89 |     38.55  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |         9         74 |        83  
           |     10.84      89.16 |    100.00  
           |    100.00     100.00 |    100.00 
 
Note: first number in each cell is the frequency, second number is the row percentage and the 
third number is the column percentage. 
 
Table 2 provides information on the timing of the AG and first IG in the same market.  Of the 31 
markets in which both an AG and an IG entered, the IG entered first in 16, the AG entered first 
in 10 and they both entered in the same month in 5 markets. 
 
Table 2:  Number of Months by which AG Precedes IG 
 
Number of Months by which AG 
Precedes IG  Freq.  Percent  Cum.  
-39  1  3.23  3.23 
-27  1  3.23  6.45 
-25  1  3.23  9.68 
-21  1  3.23  12.9 
-18  1  3.23  16.13 
-12  1  3.23  19.35 
-6  1  3.23  22.58 
-5  1  3.23  25.81 
-4  1  3.23  29.03 
-3  1  3.23  32.26 
-2  2  6.45  38.71 
-1  4  12.9  51.61 
0  5  16.13  67.74 
1  3  9.68  77.42   10
Number of Months by which AG 
Precedes IG  Freq.  Percent  Cum.  
2  3  9.68  87.1 
3  1  3.23  90.32 
8  3  9.68  100 
Total  31  100   
 
Note: a positive number means that the AG entered before the IG. 
 
Figure 1 plots data on the number of months by which AG entry precedes IG entry, by the total 
sales of the drug in 1998.  There is some evidence that in small to medium markets (markets with 
sales of $50 M or less), the AG is no more likely than the IG to enter first.  In the 4 largest 
markets, however, the AG comes in no later than the IG. 
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Table 3 presents summary data on the fraction of markets with AGs and IGs present, by the total 
sales of the drug in 1998.  The fraction of markets with an AG or IG tends to increase with the 
value of 1998 sales of the drug. 
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Table 3:  Fraction of drug markets with authorized generics and independent 
generics present, by quintiles of total sales of the drug in 1998 ($millions) 
 





1  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  19%  77% 
2  0.91  0.84  0.33  1.74  13%  63% 
3  4.55  4.52  2.58  7.26  31%  100% 
4  12.80  13.63  7.33  20.39  59%  100% 
5  83.69  45.84  23.07  308.62  69%  100% 
 
Appendix 1 presents detailed information on IG and AG entry into the 83 markets, as well as 
year specific sales in these markets. 
 
 
2.  How important is the invocation of the automatic 24 month stay under the 
PM(NOC) Regulations in determining the entry of authorized generics? 
 
My sense from the literature and discussions with industry representatives is that the PM(NOC) 
(hereafter the “NOC link”) regulations facilitate the entry of AGs, although they are not 
absolutely necessary.  A brand firm will normally not launch an AG unless it is confident that an 
IG will indeed enter.  Under the NOC link regulations, the brand firm can more accurately 
ascertain the date of expected entry of an IG into a therapeutic market than it could without the 
NOC link regulations.  The reason is that under the NOC link regulations, an IG firm is obliged 
to notify the brand firm of its intention to enter.  The NOC link regulations also give the brand 
firm the right to delay the issuance of an NOC by alleging patent infringement.  The ensuing 
litigation provides the brand firm with much more information on the entry date than it would 
otherwise have.  For instance, the brand firm can monitor the progress of the trial and hence 
forecast its outcome, providing it with information with which it can determine whether and 
when it should ready an AG.   
Without the NOC link regulations, conversely, the only information that the brand firm would 
have about IG entry is the expiration date of its patents, and Health Canada NOC approval of an 
IG drug.  
It is important, however, not to overstate the importance of the NOC link regulations in 
informing the brand firm of the expected market entry date of an IG.  First, my data indicates that 
brand firms do not always attempt to beat IG firms to the market with an AG, especially in 
markets with only modest revenue potential.  In larger markets however, the AG enters at the 
same time or some months before the IG.  Second, my brand firm contacts mentioned that even 
if they were notified of the imminent entry of an IG by some other means (say the issuance by 
Health Canada of an NOC) they could still launch an AG about the same time as an IG.  The 
reason is that an IG will usually achieve significant sales volumes only some time after it 
receives its NOC.  In particular, it takes some time for the provincial drug plans to list the IG on 
its formulary (which is the point in time at which demand for the drug increases markedly).  
Moreover, AGs might also be able to launch faster than IGs.  According to the CGPA, several   12
provincial government drug plans – including the plans operating in Alberta and Newfoundland 
– require generics to submit evidence of bioequivalence before they will reimburse the generic 
drug.  (The other plans accept Health Canada certification of bioequivalence.)  Vetting the 
bioequivalence data for an IG takes longer than that for an AG (since the AG is the brand drug, 
bioequivalence is a non-issue).  Depending on the frequency with which the assessment 
committees meet and make their recommendations re: bioequivalence, and the frequency with 
which these recommendations are acted upon by formulary committees, the AG might get listed 




3.  What are the characteristics of the drug markets that authorized generics 
enter?  In particular, how important is market size in explaining authorized 
generic entry? 
 
I estimated a probit regression model of the probability of AG entry into the drug markets.  The 
probability was modelled as a function of: (i) indicators of the brand drug firm (in the event that 
different brand firms are more or less likely to use AGs); (ii) indicators of the year of entry of the 
first generic (authorized or independent); as well as (iii) indicators of the quintiles of market 
sales in the 12 month period prior to generic entry.  These quintiles divide the drug markets into 
5 evenly sized groups, ranked by sales from smallest to largest.  The markets in the bottom 
quintile had annual sales of between $0.01 and $1.73 million; the markets in the top quintile had 
annual sales of between $50.8 and $485 million (Table 4). 
 
Table 4:  Mean, median, min and max total sales ($million) in drug market in the 
year before generic entry, by sales quintile 
 
Quintile  Mean  Median  Min  Max 
1  0.73  0.73  0.01  1.73 
2  4.75  4.94  1.76  7.11 
3  14.02  14.78  7.21  18.55 
4  25.92  25.46  20.07  35.90 
5  161.99  121.27  50.84  485.20 
 
The model estimates indicate that of the three factors considered above, factor (iii), market size, 
is the strongest predictor of AG entry.  Holding constant the influence of factors (i) and (ii), the 
                                                 
10 An IG executive I interviewed recounted how their launch of ramipril was pre-empted by an 
AG: “We got our NOC on Dec 12, after years of litigation, and sent our submission to Alberta by 
courier on Dec.13.  It arrived Dec 14.  Sanofi-Aventis arranged for a NOC for authorized generic 
to be issued to ratiopharm on Dec 13.  Because they did not have to file a substantive submission 
in Alberta but are automatically accepted because same as brand, Alberta considered their 
submission complete on Dec 13.  Our submission had to include data and was very large, and 
thus could not be transmitted by fax.  It arrived at Alberta Health on Dec 14 as aforesaid.  
Alberta fast-tracks the first generic. Hence they proceed to immediately list the ratio product 
and not ours, and ratio thus took the whole Alberta market. …” 
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bigger is the market size, the greater is the likelihood of AG entry.  Compared to markets in the 
lowest sales quintile, AGs were: 33 percentage points more likely to enter markets in the second 
lowest sales quintile (p=0.196), 45 percentage points more likely to enter markets in the middle 
sales quintile (p=0.059), 43 percentage points more likely to enter markets in the second highest 
sales quintile (p=0.081), and 64 percentage points more likely to enter markets in the top sales 
quintile (p=0.004). 
 
A useful summary statistic is the R-squared; this statistic reflects the amount of variation in the 
outcome variable that is explained by predictor variables.  I note that my AG entry probability 
model pseudo-R-squared is decent (29%) for a cross sectional data set.  This likely reflects the 
strong predictive performance of pre-IG market sales; the remaining explanatory variables had 
apparently little explanatory power.  Specifically, there were no noticeably different probabilities 
of AG entry among the different brand firms.  (Novartis Pharma and Pfizer had slightly higher 
probabilities of issuing AGs than the other brand firms, but it is not clear if this is a chance 
result.)  Similarly, there were no discernable trends in the likelihood of AG entry by year.   
 
 
4.  What is the impact of authorized generics on drug prices and the entry of 
independent generics?  
 
Recall that, theoretically, AGs have offsetting effects on drug prices.  On the one hand, AGs 
compete against IGs and increases in the number of generic competitors should lower prices.  On 
the other hand, the brand firm might raise prices on its branded drug to increase the sales revenue 
accruing to its AG drug.  Moreover, the threat of AG entry into a therapeutic market might deter 
entry by IGs and this would lessen competition.   
 
One therefore needs to assess the net effect of AGs on drug prices.  One can do so by considering 
the effects of AGs on drug prices in drug markets with and without generic drugs present.  The 
impact of AGs on markets with a generic drug (IG or AG) present can inform the impact of AG 
competition on drug prices, after accounting for the fact that brand firms might increase branded 
drug prices when an AG is present.  I develop and estimate a drug price model that addresses this 
question.  This model uses IMS data on the average prices charged for the drug molecules in 
which a generic drug entered between 1998 and 2004.  This model, however, does not inform the 
question as to how the threat of AG entry deters IG entry in marginally profitable markets and 
how the attendant reduction in competition translates into higher prices.  The impact of AGs on 
IG entry is the difference between the likelihood of IG entry with the threat of AG entry present 
and the likelihood of IG entry without the threat of AG entry.  It is difficult to estimate this 
impact.  While data on the drug markets in which IGs have entered is readily available, it is 
difficult to determine which drug markets IGs would have attempted to enter had it not been for 
the threat of AG entry.  In particular, while we can directly observe the drug markets in which all 
relevant patents have expired but in which there are no IGs, it is not obvious which patent-
protected drug markets would have been successfully challenged by IG firms (perhaps because 
the patents were sufficiently weak) but were not due to the threat of AG entry.  Yet these data are 
required to address the question. 
 
I explored various approaches to addressing this question.  For instance, I investigated whether it 
was possible to analyze annual data on the threshold market size, above which an IG enters.  If   14
the advent of AG competition in the Canadian market occurred recently then it might be possible 
to examine time series data on these market size thresholds in period before and after the advent 
of AG competition.  It turns out however that AGs have competed in the Canadian market since 
at least 1987, making it difficult to collect data in the period before AG competition began. 
 
Instead of conducting a quantitative analysis of AGs on the likelihood of IG entry, I used 
qualitative methods.  Specifically I interviewed executives of a major domestic IG firm about the 
effect of the threat of AG entry on the threshold market size above which the IG will attempt to 




I developed a linear regression model of average prices charged to consumers (i.e. drug insurers, 
and patients paying out of pocket) each month, in each of the 83 drug markets described in 
Appendix 1.  The average monthly price in each of these markets is simply total monthly sales 
revenues across all strengths and manufacturers of the drug (including brand and generic firms) 
divided by the total number of milligrams (mg) of the drug dispensed.  The total mgs of the drug 
dispensed, in turn, is the number of units dispensed times the strength in mgs per unit.  I deemed 
expenditure per mg of drug dispensed to be the best measure of average price charged – it 
automatically standardizes prices charged consumers for differences in the market shares of the 
brand and generic products.  Importantly, it is sensitive to any increases in brand price that might 
occur after AG entry.  And unlike a price measure based on expenditure per prescription, my 
measure is sensitive to the number of units dispensed per prescription and the strength per unit.    
 
The IMS sales data are derived from a sample of total prescription drug sales and volumes at 
over 2000 representative retail pharmacies.  The sales data include all wholesale and retail 
markups and dispensing fees, so that some of my consumer price variable represents payments to 
wholesalers and pharmacies.  Below, I explain how my model will account for the influence of 
variation in such payments. 
 
I modelled the average drug and month specific price as a function of the following covariates: 
 
•  Indicators of various levels of the authorized generic share of the generic prescription 
volume, measured as the total number of mgs dispensed.  As Hollis (2005) notes, this 
variable was thought to better capture the degree of AG market penetration than a simple 
binary indicator of AG entry.  The use of multiple indicators, each indicating the degree 
of AG penetration (0%, 1-20%, 21-40%, 41-60%, 61-80%, 81-100%) allows for non-
linear effects of AG entry on price.
11 
12  
                                                 
11 Hollis (2005) presents evidence that the AG share of the generic market is endogenous in the 
price model; i.e. AG share is correlated with an unobserved component of price.   He therefore 
developed an instrumental variables estimator using as an instrument the number of months by 
which the AG beats the first IG to market.  I deal with the possible endogeneity of AG share in 
my price model by using the one period lagged values of AG share and number of IGs instead 
of their contemporaneous values. 
12 In some versions of the empirical price models, I distinguished between AGs that are licensed 
to a subsidiary of the brand firm from the AGs that are licensed to an IG firm, in order to assess   15
•  Indicators of various levels of the number of independent generic competitors  
•  Drug market specific indicators (included to pick up time-invariant differences in the 
price per mg of the different molecules; this will also pick up the influence of market size 
and other time-invariant factors that might affect entry by IG and AG firms) 
•  Quarter of year indicators (included to pick up time period-specific changes in the price 
common to all the different drug markets, such as changes in pharmacy and wholesaler 
mark-ups and fees) 
 
I modelled the effects of AG generic market shares and other predictor variables on the log 
average price per mg.  Focussing on log price allowed me to assess the effects of changes in the 
AG generic market share on relative (percentage) price changes, which is intuitively more 
appealing that absolute changes in price per mg.
13   
 
I used all available data, except that I removed observations on nefazadone after it was pulled 
from the market due to safety concerns in January 2004.  Although there were a few price 
observations available after this date, the average price was very poorly estimated. 
 
I also estimated the price model using the subset of the data which remained after dropping 
observations on drug markets in which the price and generic market share data were measured 
with considerable error.
14  Measurement error can decrease the precision of one’s model 
estimates and I wanted to ensure that my results were robust to measurement error.
15  The reader 
is invited to inspect drug market specific data on monthly average price, average brand drug 
price, generic drug share of the market, and authorized generic drug share of the market, 
presented at http://individual.utoronto.ca/grootendorst/pdf/drugpricegraphs.pdf to assess the 
degree of measurement error in these drug markets. 
 
The price models fit the data quite well – R squared values all exceed 95%.   (See Appendix 2 
for details of the model results.)  Moreover, the parameter estimates are plausible.  The models 
suggest, for instance, that increases in the number of independent generic drugs reduce average 
prices.   
                                                                                                                                                             
whether this distinction makes a difference to the estimated impact of AG generic drug share 
on average price.  The data were not sufficiently informative to detect a difference. 
13 The log transformed price model is also more consistent with the data than the linear price 
model:  I subjected the average price model to the boxcox transform to determine whether a 
linear or log specification was more appropriate – the linear specification was handily rejected 
in favour of the log specification.   
14 Recall that the IMS sales data are estimates based on a representative sample of pharmacies.  
For some drugs with low prescribing volumes, the price estimates are highly variable.  This could 
be because of the limitations of survey sampling.  It could also reflect a limitation with my data.  I 
had to enter manually into my database sales data for the years 1998-2000.  (IMS data older 
than 72 months are available in hardcopy only.)  The dollar sales and quantities data in these 
hardcopies are rounded to the nearest 1000 dollars or units, which can introduce measurement 
error when the underlying sales volumes are small. 
15 Specifically, I removed the follow drugs:  Amiodarone Inj, Cefuroxime Axetil Liquid, 
Ciprofloxacin Liquid, Clavulanic Acid Liquid, Clindamycin Inj, Clindamycin Liquid, Cyclosporine 
Inj, Cyclosporine Liquid, Fenofibrate, Fluconazole Inj, Fluconazole Liquid, Ketorolac Inj, Labetalol 
Inj, Lamotrigine Chewable, Piperacillin, Propofol, Tizanidine, Vancomycin Inj, Warfarin Inj.     16
 
The models suggest that AGs are mildly pro-competitive.  Focusing on the results in model 1.3, 
when AGs capture 80-100% of the generic market, that is, when they are the first or among the 
first to enter the market, they unambiguously reduce prices by about 11%.  When the AG generic 
market share is in the range of 21-80%, prices drop by a smaller degree – between 5 and 7%.  
When the AG generic market share is in the range of 1-20%, prices drop by an even smaller 
degree – about 3%.  This suggests that the average per mg price of the brand drug increases as 
IGs take market share away from the AG (otherwise the additional competition provided by IGs 
would lower average price). 
  
To investigate further, I estimated models of the impact on AG generic market share on the 
average brand drug price per mg.  These models suggest that average brand prices are slightly 
higher (between 2-8%) when AGs control between 1-40% of the generic market compared to 
when they are not sold at all.  (Brand prices are essentially unchanged when AGs control 41-




The generic firm executive indicated that AGs have their primary anticompetitive effect on the 
decision of IGs to enter a drug market.  He indicated that with AGs present, and under the 
current set of ODB drug reimbursement regulations, he will not bother challenging a drug market 
with less than $10 million in annual sales.  He reasoned as follows. 
 
Generics can charge at most 50% of the brand price so that potential revenues drop to $5 million.  
Even if his IG firm is the first on the market, he can get at most 75% of the entire market (recall 
that RAMQ and some private plans will continue to cover brand drugs even with generics 
available).  This reduces revenues to 0.75×$5m = $3.75m.  Under the new ODB regulations, the 
cost of rebates to pharmacies is about 40% (down from over 50%).  Hence revenues net of 
rebates are 0.6×$3.75m= $2.25m.  Production costs (raw materials, labour and indirect 
overheads, including depreciation) are roughly 40% of revenues; revenues net of production 
costs are therefore 0.6×$2.25m=$1.35m.  Selling expenses, including administration, 
distribution, and the legal costs of challenging patents reduce net revenues by a further 15%; 
hence 0.85×$1.35m=$1.15m remains after deducting selling expenses.  R&D costs (including the 
costs of obtaining regulatory approval to sell the generic) represent a further 15% of sales hence 
0.85×$1.15m=$0.98m remains. 
 
Hence net revenues are about $980,000 for each year in which they control the generic market.  
The anticipated flow of net revenues over time, accounting for the usual patterns of IG 
competition and gradual obsolescence of the drug market, is sufficiently lucrative for the firm to 
challenge a drug market.  However, if an AG does enter, the executive I interviewed stated that 
he assumes that he will lose about 50% of the market so that net revenues fall to 0.5×$980,000 
=$490,000 annually which, the executive claims, is the point at which he would not bother 
challenging.  If he was certain that there would be no AG entry, he would challenge drug 
markets with $5+ million in annual sales. 
   17
Hence, taking the statements of the IG executive at face value, the effect of the threat of AG 
entry is to increase the minimum market size that justifies a challenge from the IG from $5 to 
$10 million.  Assuming that generic prices would be about 50% of brand prices if an IG did 
enter, and assuming that no other generics enter markets with less than $10m in annual sales, the 
threat of AG competition raises consumer costs by about 50% for every market not challenged.  
Assuming that the average size of the markets that go unchallenged on account of the threat of 
AG entry is $7.5m, the threat of AG entry increases drug payer costs by $3.75m annually (over 
the remaining life of the drug) for every market that goes unchallenged. 
 
The IG executive stated that AG competition discourages them from challenging brand drugs 
with sales well above $10m for which developing and producing a generic drug is particularly 
costly, for two reasons.
16  First, as before, the threat of AG would take away IG market share and 
hence revenues.  Second, AG competition in markets the IG has entered has reduced their 
retained earnings.  This reduction in retained earnings has hampered their ability to finance 
development of specialized production capacity, and the cost of clinical studies.  (According to 
the IG executive, many drugs are not amenable to bio-equivalence studies and require 
comparative clinical trials that can cost many millions or even tens of millions of dollars per 
study.)  The CGPA shared with me a survey of eight participating generic firms conducted by 
IBM Global Business Services that, at face value, corroborates the claims of the IG executive.  
(The study was based on firms’ responses that were not audited or otherwise validated by IBM.)  
The IBM study concludes: “Canadian generic pharmaceutical manufacturers continue to 
experience a financial loss on their sales in Canada. The net loss on Canadian sales was -2.7% in 
2002 and the net loss for 2005 remained at -2.7%”  
 
In order to validate these claims, one would need to analyse data on the minimum market size 
below which no generics will enter.  According to the executive at the IG firm, the decision by 
an IG firm to challenge a brand drug is typically based on the sales of the brand drug in the 10
th 
year that it has been on the market.  To verify the claims by the IG executive, one would need to 
construct a time series of the year 10 sales of brand drugs and determine, for each of these drugs, 
whether an IG was observed to eventually enter. 
 
Further deterrent effects of AGs on IG entry 
 
Finally, the IG executive claimed that brand firms have attempted to use the threat of AG entry 
to negotiate agreements with their IG firm to delay entry until entry by another IG firm is 
imminent, at which time their IG firm will launch an AG.  The proposed agreements involve 
                                                 
16 The IG executive cited as examples the following brand drugs (with annual sales) which will 
likely not be challenged: Eprex $200 m, Remicade $170 m, Enbrel $160 m, Herceptin $160 m, 
Flovent HFA $130 m, Advair $125 m, Duragesic $115 m, Aranesp $115 m, Rituxin $110 m, Rebif $ 
85 m, Neupogen $ 80 m, Prevnar $ 75 m, Symbiocort $ 60 m, Spiriva $ 60 m, Advair MDI $ 60 m, 
Copaxone $ 60 m, Zoladex LA $ 55 m, Betaseron $ 50 m, Lupron Depot $ 50 m.  A brand firm 
executive countered that he would be very surprised if at least some of these drugs were not 
challenged by a generic.   18





5.  How important are market opportunities in the U.S. at explaining the 
decisions of independent generic firms to enter a particular market? 
 
IG firm representatives stated that market opportunities in the U.S. do not affect their decisions 
to enter domestic drug markets. The reason is that they incur fixed entry costs each time they 
challenge a brand drug in one of their three primary markets (Canada, US and the EU).  These 
costs include the legal and related costs of challenging outstanding patents, and the costs of 
obtaining regulatory approval, the requirements of which typically vary by market.  The different 
jurisdictions do not recognize court decisions made in other jurisdictions so that, for example, if 
an IG earns the right to sell a generic drug in the US that does not automatically allow them to 
sell in Canada.  Moreover, regulations concerning the size, shape and color, and chemical 
properties of both the active ingredients and binding agents vary by jurisdiction so that the costs 





My analyses suggest that when AGs are among the first to enter a market, prices drop by about 
12%.  This seems plausible: the first generic is regulated to launch at a price no greater than70% 
of the brand price and this should depress average prices paid for the drug.  When AGs control 
between 1-40% of the generic market, the average price paid per mg of the brand drug increases 
slightly.  It is unclear why this is the case.  A brand firm contact did not believe that actual prices 
increase because both federal regulators (i.e. the PMPRB) and provincial drug plans limit drug 
price growth.  One possibility is that the brand sales that do accrue after substantial entry by IGs 
are for rarely-used, non-genericized dosage forms and strengths that carry a higher per mg price 
than the forms/strengths that have been genericized.  Irrespective of the impact of AG market 
share on brand prices, however, I find that AGs are mildly pro-competitive in drug markets that 
face some generic competition. 
 
But IG firm executives state that the threat of AG entry has decreased their incentive to challenge 
‘marginal’ drug markets.  In particular the threat of AG entry has increased from $5m to $10m 
                                                 
17 One IG executive I interviewed stated: “Just as is now happening systematically in the US, 
brand companies in Canada are also using the threat to launch an authorized generic to extort 
deals with generic firms.  i.e. they say: "if you proceed with an independent generic, we will 
launch an authorized generic and sell at low prices (subsidized by the continuing high priced 
sales under the brand label) and you will make nothing.  So let's make a deal (at the expense of 
consumers) to avoid or delay competition and somehow share the benefits."  The deals involve 
one or more features: 
1. Generic agrees not to proceed with its own product, and to sell the authorized generic, but 
not until another independent generic is approved or about to be approved 
2. Generic agrees not to launch its own product, but instead takes over manufacture of the 
product for the brand, and gets paid more for doing so than it would earn if it competed.” 
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the threshold market size – the value of brand drug sales in the 10th year that it has been on the 
market, below which the IG firm will not attempt to enter.   
 
IG executives also stated that AGs reduce IG earnings in markets which IGs do enter.  The 
attendant loss of retained earnings hampers their ability to challenge brand drugs with sales well 
above $10m, but which have particularly high entry costs.  Finally, the IG executives claimed 
that brand firms have attempted to use the threat of AG entry to negotiate agreements with their 
IG firm to delay entry until entry by another IG firm is imminent, at which time their IG firm 
will launch an AG.   
 
A comprehensive evaluation of the competitive effects of AGs would need to verify and quantify 
these costs and compare these to the benefits of AG competition. 
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Date AG Firm IG
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Launch 
Date First IG Firm
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ALENDRONATE Merck Frosst Canada 1996m1 0 1 2003m5 Novopharm 2 42.021 64.025 79.44 90.891 109.292 143.824 168.461 121.269 93.853
AMCINONIDE Stiefel 1979m1 0 1 2003m8 Taropharma 2 3 3.229 4.9 6.204 6.642 7.011 6.861 6.961 6.386
AMIODARONE Wyeth Pharmaceutical 1986m5 1 2000m6 Ratiopharm 1 1999m6 Novopharm -12 6 23.074 26.225 22.814 27.584 29.402 29.346 27.796 25.46 20.906
AMIODARONE INJ Wyeth Pharmaceutical 1986m5 0 1 2001m1 Sandoz Canada Inc. 2000 0.003 0.008 0.022 0.01
BETAXOLOL Alcon Canada 1986m7 0 1 2000m6 Sandoz Canada Inc. 1 10.678 10.378 9.633 9.003 8.159 7.396 6.403 10.05 10.517
BISOPROLOL Biovail Pharma 2000m7 0 1 2003m8 Sandoz Canada Inc. 2 0 0 0.078 2.651 10.036 18.952 24.291 15.423 6.561
BRIMONIDINE Allergan 1997m12 1 2002m9 Ratiopharm 1 2002m12 Pharmascience 3 1 4.065 10.669 13.905 14.628 15.356 13.178 12.173 15.323 14.572
BUTORPHANOL Bristol Myers Squibb 1994m10 0 1 2000m10 Apotex Inc. 2 7.261 8.22 6.797 5.644 5.673 5.218 4.743 7.206 8.088
CALCITONIN (SALMON) Sanofis Aventis 1976m8 0 1 2000m1 Novartis Pharma 3 0 0 4.295 9.637 14.268 14.781 13.33
CARVEDILOL GlaxoSmithKline 1996m10 0 1 2003m9 Pharmascience 5 6.573 10.635 13.528 17.008 20.116 22.737 21.818 21.57 19.067
CEFADROXIL Bristol Myers Squibb 1981m1 0 1 2000m3 Novopharm 2 1.739 1.728 1.472 1.652 1.776 1.929 1.968 1.669 1.727
CEFUROXIME AXETIL GlaxoSmithKline 1990m8 1 2001m10 Ratiopharm 1 2001m12 Apotex Inc. 2 1 30.016 32.047 32.359 28.12 19.104 16.215 14.553 28.752 33.483
CEFUROXIME AXETIL LIQUID GlaxoSmithKline 1990m8 0 0 0 0.997 1.079 1.26 1.26 1.143 1.102 0.951
CIPROFLOXACIN Bayer Pharma 1989m1 1 2004m2 Pharmascience 1 2004m2 Sandoz Canada Inc. 0 9 76.961 85.165 92.363 87.006 87.132 91.789 81.028 91.781 87.487
CIPROFLOXACIN LIQUID Bayer Pharma 1989m1 0 0 0 0 0 0.144 0.296 0.298 0.305 0.344
CITALOPRAM Lundbeck 1999m3 1 2004m1 Pharmascience 1 2004m1 Apotex Inc. 0 8 0 7.638 50.753 97.748 141.228 191.635 196.28 191.635 141.228
CLAVULANIC ACID GlaxoSmithKline 1984m4 1 2001m6 Ratiopharm 1 2001m6 Apotex Inc. 0 2 14.363 14.297 15.437 16.904 14.294 14.827 13.99 17.456 13.933
CLAVULANIC ACID LIQUID GlaxoSmithKline 1984m4 1 2002m8 Ratiopharm 1 2002m4 Apotex Inc. -4 1 5.949 5.407 5.63 6.034 5.872 5.144 4.627 5.865 6.125
CLINDAMYCIN Pfizer 1970m3 1 2000m6 Ratiopharm 1 2000m3 Novopharm -3 4 14.867 19.278 19.754 18.242 19.26 20.017 20.88 20.07 15.426
CLINDAMYCIN INJ Pfizer 1970m3 0 1 2000m6 Sandoz Canada Inc. 4 0 0 0.16 0.264 0.253 0.428 0.444
CLINDAMYCIN LIQUID Pfizer 1970m3 0 0 0 0.473 0.473 0.47 0.484 0.599 0.646 0.622
CLOBAZAM Pendopharm 1991m4 0 1 1998m9 Novopharm 5 4.335 4.095 4.311 4.74 4.948 4.998 5.044 4.229
CLOZAPINE Novartis Pharma 1991m4 0 1 2003m5 Genpharm Pharma 2 15.455 18.293 21.558 26.323 30.915 36.175 39.976 32.525 27.858
COLISTIN Erfa Canada Inc. 1971m4 0 1 2002m10 Sterimax Inc. 1 0 0 1.019 1.677 1.657 2.201 2.837 1.615 1.655
CYCLOSPORINE Novartis Pharma 1984m4 1 2002m4 Sandoz Canada Inc. 0 0 0 0 0.035 0.031 0.078 0.825 1.306
CYCLOSPORINE INJ Novartis Pharma 1984m4 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.006
CYCLOSPORINE LIQUID Novartis Pharma 1984m4 0 1 2002m8 Apotex Inc. 1000 0.001 0.013 0.102 0.257 0.002
DEFEROXAMINE Novartis Pharma 1973m1 1 2000m10 Novartis Pharma 1 2000m12 Mayne Pharma CDA 2 1 0 0 1.022 1.842 2.94 3.164 2.464 1.73
DIVALPROEX Abbott 1984m4 1 1999m6 Novopharm 1 1999m5 Nu-Pharm Inc. -1 4 26.868 33.427 31.477 34.551 36.951 37.521 38.064 29.424 25.494
DOXAZOSIN Astrazeneca 1992m3 0 1 1999m12 Apotex Inc. 6 11.655 13.825 12.816 11.673 11.386 11.19 10.807 13.726 11.441
ETIDRONIC ACID P&G Pharma 1979m7 0 1 2003m12 Genpharm Pharma 1 4.706 2.386 1.929 1.579 1.272 1.068 0.83 1.079 1.298
FENOFIBRATE Fournier 1991m1 0 1 1998m1 Apotex Inc. 3 0.884 0.945 0.73 0.549 0.393 0.345 0.329
FENOFIBRATE MICRO Fournier 1995m3 1 1999m7 Pharmascience 1 1999m6 Apotex Inc. -1 7 60.761 62.971 59.39 56.639 46.093 40.514 36.132 62.658 58.032
FLAVOXATE Paladin 1986m11 0 1 2002m7 Apotex Inc. 3 4.895 4.711 4.487 4.235 3.221 2.239 1.665 3.789 4.482
FLOCTAFENINE Sanofis Aventis 1980m9 0 1 2002m7 Apotex Inc. 1 2.575 2.211 1.684 1.333 1.026 0.627 0.52 1.211 1.501
FLUCONAZOLE Pfizer 1990m9 1 2002m8 Novopharm 1 1999m5 Apotex Inc. -39 4 7.328 6.873 7.75 7.93 8.293 7.846 7.663 7.11 6.792
FLUCONAZOLE 150MG Pfizer 1995m3 1 2002m8 Novopharm 1 2000m5 Apotex Inc. -27 4 9.502 12.385 14.212 14.706 15.601 16.277 16.83 13.066 10.953
FLUCONAZOLE INJ Pfizer 1990m9 0 1 2004m5 Omega 2 0 0 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.004 0.026 0.019 0.014
FLUCONAZOLE LIQUID Pfizer 1990m9 0 0 0 0.358 0.628 0.599 0.435 0.505 0.521 0.532
FLUNARIZINE Pharmascience 1990m6 0 1 2000m6 Novopharm 2 3.469 2.935 2.637 2.533 2.363 1.831 1.563 2.59 3.448
FOSINOPRIL Bristol Myers Squibb 1992m5 1 2004m5 Linson 1 2003m12 Novopharm -5 1 44.463 53.352 59.049 62.182 62.575 61.748 50.649 61.847 62.368
GABAPENTIN Pfizer 1994m5 1 2001m3 Pharmascience 1 2001m11 Apotex Inc. 8 6 12.264 22.724 40.6 60.616 66.861 80.575 95.887 58.795 36.907
GLICLAZIDE Servier Lab 1990m10 1 2000m6 Ratiopharm 1 1998m9 Novopharm -21 4 13.631 14.735 15.856 16.483 16.193 16.141 16.665 13.168
HYDROXYCHLOROQUINE Sanofis Aventis 1952m1 0 1 2003m1 Apotex Inc. 2 8.474 14.367 15.595 17.11 18.549 19.045 17.718 18.549 17.11
HYDROXYUREA Bristol Myers Squibb 1981m7 0 1 2001m6 Genpharm Pharma 2 3.946 4.528 4.734 4.872 3.954 3.679 3.549 4.941 4.504
KETOROLAC Roche 1991m4 0 1 1998m7 Novopharm 3 14.063 13.065 11.612 11.156 11.201 10.93 10.728 14.242
KETOROLAC INJ Roche 1991m4 0 1 2000m6 Sandoz Canada Inc. 3 0.332 0.371 0.267 0.313 0.288 0.266 0.315 0.349 0.354
LABETALOL Shire Canada Inc. 1983m12 0 1 2001m7 Apotex Inc. 1 2.77 3.646 4.079 4.842 5.069 4.886 4.942 4.538 3.836
LABETALOL INJ Shire Canada Inc. 1983m12 0 1 2000m11 Sandoz Canada Inc. 1 0 0 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.005
LAMOTRIGINE GlaxoSmithKline 1995m2 1 2002m10 Ratiopharm 1 2002m9 Apotex Inc. -1 3 5.578 8.115 11.129 13.771 17.239 17.721 19.503 16.029 12.776
LAMOTRIGINE CHEWABLE GlaxoSmithKline 1995m2 0 0 0 0 0 0.022 0.051 0.074 0.105 0.103
LEFLUNOMIDE Sanofis Aventis 2000m4 0 1 2004m10 Apotex Inc. 1 0 0 2.24 9.84 13.982 17.921 21.211 20.814 17.05
LORATADINE Schering Health Care 1988m6 0 1 2001m10 Apotex Inc. 1 5.423 5.324 5.036 5.368 4.895 4.391 3.921 5.289 5.056
MELOXICAM Boeringher Ingelheim 2000m10 1 2004m2 Ratiopharm 1 2003m12 Pharmascience -2 6 0 0 0.239 22.995 43.469 51.451 46.405 50.835 42.324
METHAZOLAMIDE Wyeth Pharmaceutical 1977m1 0 1 2002m9 Apotex Inc. 1 1.722 1.613 1.263 1.135 0.645 0.236 0.247 0.941 1.184
MIDAZOLAM Roche 1988m2 0 1 2000m6 Sandoz Canada Inc. 4 0 0 0.161 0.337 0.421 0.446 0.528
MIRTAZAPINE Organon 2001m5 0 1 2004m1 Pharmascience 4000 2.412 13.846 25.024 30.201 25.024 13.846
MISOPROSTOL Pfizer 1986m4 1 2001m12 Novopharm 1 2002m2 Apotex Inc. 2 2 15.783 13.66 10.221 7.782 5.961 3.977 3.41 7.624 10.04
MOMETASONE Schering Health Care 1991m1 0 1 2004m1 Pharmascience 2 9.902 12.122 18.586 23.089 23.977 22.639 23.967 22.639 23.977
NABUMETONE GlaxoSmithKline 1994m4 0 1 1999m4 Apotex Inc. 5 17.37 15.537 6.992 4.623 3.733 3.179 2.816 18.292 15.187
NEFAZODONE Bristol Myers Squibb 1994m5 1 2001m2 Linson 1 2001m1 Apotex inc. -1 5 28.875 35.044 35.904 30.248 19.989 12.824 0.019 35.904 35.044
NORFLOXACIN Merck Frosst Canada 1986m7 0 1 1998m12 Apotex Inc. 5 20.386 16.246 13.998 13.602 12.951 11.748 10.745 20.395
OMEPRAZOLE Astrazeneca 1989m6 0 1 2004m2 Apotex Inc. 1 308.624 347.441 419.006 485.661 497.623 489.416 449.887 485.196 497.27
OXAPROZIN Pfizer 1997m1 0 1 2001m11 Sandoz Canada Inc. 2 3.119 2.271 0.888 0.539 0.4 0.317 0.305 0.57 1.017
PAMIDRONIC ACID Novartis Pharma 1992m5 1 2003m11 Pharmascience 1 2001m10 Mayne Pharma CDA -25 1 0 0 1.381 1.738 2.036 2.113 2.159 1.764 2.615
PAROXETINE GlaxoSmithKline 1993m5 1 2003m10 Ratiopharm 1 2003m10 Apotex Inc. 0 7 141.428 187.954 227.924 251.222 270.704 280.91 214.452 281.474 266.212
PIPERACILLIN Wyeth Pharmaceutical 1982m6 0 1 2003m5 Mayne Pharma CDA 1 0 0 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.008 0.012 0.007 0.014
PRAVASTATIN Bristol Myers Squibb 1990m10 1 2000m7 Linson 1 2001m3 Apotex Inc. 8 9 154.869 164.267 167.505 140.784 137.448 134.226 117.134 167.598 164.787
PROPAFENONE Abbott 1987m11 1 2001m6 Pharmascience 1 2001m4 Apotex Inc. -2 2 13.627 15.235 15.728 16.908 15.245 11.713 9.93 16.127 15.348
PROPOFOL Astrazeneca 1990m10 0 1 2000m6 Hospira 3 0 0 0.018 0.068 0.058 0.063 0.07
SERTRALINE Pfizer 1992m2 0 1 1999m9 Novopharm 10 118.018 139.604 124.8 113.005 109.288 104.978 99.962 134.315 112.648
SIMVASTATIN Merck Frosst Canada 1990m8 0 1 2003m1 Apotex Inc. 11 182.128 200.179 211.731 242.938 335.441 331.731 285.324 335.441 242.938
SUFENTANIL Janssen-Ortho Inc. 1985m10 0 1 2002m2 Sandoz Canada Inc. 1 0 0 0.009 0.031 0.047 0.132 0.134 0.033 0.016
TERBINAFINE Novartis Pharma 1993m5 1 2000m4 Pharmascience 1 2000m12 Apotex Inc. 8 5 26.777 27.439 27.85 24.918 24.002 25.053 25.308 28.099 27.173
TERCONAZOLE Janssen-Ortho Inc. 1990m12 0 1 2004m11 Taro Pharm 1 8.197 8.037 7.485 7.123 6.579 6.145 5.378 5.487 6.203
TICLOPIDINE Roche 1991m9 1 2001m5 Pharmascience 1 1998m6 Apotex Inc. -35 7 26.882 21.034 14.842 11.413 9.093 7.295 5.889 26.551
TIZANIDINE Shire Canada Inc. 1999m11 0 1 2004m12 Apotex Inc. 1 0 0 0.635 1.208 1.747 2.234 2.613 2.574 2.206
TRIFLURIDINE Theramed Ltd. 1984m10 0 1 2004m3 Sandoz Canada Inc. 1 0.788 0.879 0.82 0.821 0.855 0.888 0.909 0.896 0.858
TRIMEBUTINE Axcan Pharma 1983m12 0 1 2002m12 Apotex Inc. 1 5.119 5.539 6.104 6.346 6.586 5.981 5.333 6.573 6.34
VANCOMYCIN Lilly 1959m1 0 0 0 0 0 0.866 1.697 1.941 2.41 4.179
VANCOMYCIN INJ Lilly 1959m1 0 1 2000m8 Pharma Partners 3 0 0 0.149 0.233 0.336 0.616 0.782 0.134
WARFARIN Bristol Myers Squibb 1956m5 0 1 2000m11 Taro Pharm 3 47.216 55.335 61.88 60.847 62.113 65.131 66.736 61.55 53.652
WARFARIN INJ Bristol Myers Squibb 1956m5 0 0 0 0 0 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.01 0.008
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Appendix 2 Models of log average price in markets with generic entry 
 




      All drug markets used 
      Indicators of one period lagged AG generic market share  
      Indicators of total number of generic drugs introduced 
      Drug market specific indicators 
      Quarter of year indicator variables dropped 
      Robust standard error estimator used 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    6021 
                                                       F( 97,  5922) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9913 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .24311 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
         lap |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 laggshare20 |  -.0145032   .0134825    -1.08   0.282    -.0409338    .0119274 
 laggshare40 |  -.0586768   .0113652    -5.16   0.000    -.0809568   -.0363968 
 laggshare60 |  -.0604383   .0123816    -4.88   0.000    -.0847108   -.0361657 
 laggshare80 |  -.0479509    .014568    -3.29   0.001    -.0765094   -.0193924 
laggshare100 |  -.1086092   .0119177    -9.11   0.000    -.1319722   -.0852462 
   ldtotgen1 |  -.1157372   .0135166    -8.56   0.000    -.1422345   -.0892398 
   ldtotgen2 |  -.1955292   .0128613   -15.20   0.000     -.220742   -.1703164 
   ldtotgen3 |  -.2491113   .0159344   -15.63   0.000    -.2803485   -.2178741 
   ldtotgen4 |  -.2650327   .0121951   -21.73   0.000    -.2889397   -.2411258 
   ldtotgen5 |  -.3045973   .0131185   -23.22   0.000    -.3303143   -.2788804 
   ldtotgen6 |  -.2723459   .0191917   -14.19   0.000    -.3099686   -.2347233 
   ldtotgen7 |  -.3274495   .0146875   -22.29   0.000    -.3562424   -.2986566 
   ldtotgen8 |  -.3444357   .0169227   -20.35   0.000    -.3776103    -.311261 
   ldtotgen9 |  -.4054365   .0179062   -22.64   0.000    -.4405392   -.3703339 
  ldtotgen10 |  -.5595747    .014723   -38.01   0.000    -.5884372   -.5307122 
  ldtotgen11 |  -.5645092   .0149968   -37.64   0.000    -.5939084   -.5351101 
       drug2 |   3.428896   .0088876   385.81   0.000     3.411473    3.446319 
       drug3 |    -2.8618   .0104877  -272.87   0.000    -2.882359    -2.84124 
       drug4 |   1.195959   .0904644    13.22   0.000     1.018616    1.373302 
       drug5 |   4.191443   .0106382   394.00   0.000     4.170588    4.212298 
       drug6 |  -.6420946   .0084044   -76.40   0.000    -.6585702    -.625619 
       drug7 |   4.755167   .0097976   485.34   0.000      4.73596    4.774373 
       drug8 |   2.575338   .0230683   111.64   0.000     2.530116    2.620561 
       drug9 |  -2.639401   .0288492   -91.49   0.000    -2.695956   -2.582846 
      drug10 |   -.475864   .0107014   -44.47   0.000    -.4968427   -.4548853 
      drug11 |   -4.09638   .0116516  -351.57   0.000    -4.119222   -4.073539 
      drug12 |  -3.324511   .0101459  -327.67   0.000      -3.3444   -3.304621 
      drug13 |  -4.622968    .021668  -213.35   0.000    -4.665445   -4.580491 
      drug14 |  -3.289993   .0104862  -313.74   0.000     -3.31055   -3.269437 
      drug15 |  -5.053125   .0084384  -598.82   0.000    -5.069667   -5.036582 
      drug16 |   -1.00875   .0104285   -96.73   0.000    -1.029194   -.9883065 
      drug17 |  -3.977562   .0121738  -326.73   0.000    -4.001427   -3.953697 
      drug18 |   -5.18226   .0090506  -572.59   0.000    -5.200002   -5.164517 
      drug19 |  -3.392844   .0106829  -317.60   0.000    -3.413787   -3.371902 
      drug20 |  -2.768377    .045196   -61.25   0.000    -2.856977   -2.679776 
      drug21 |  -4.541323   .0122875  -369.59   0.000     -4.56541   -4.517235 
      drug22 |  -1.417252   .0116229  -121.94   0.000    -1.440037   -1.394467 
      drug23 |  -1.513434    .010407  -145.42   0.000    -1.533835   -1.493032 
      drug24 |   .0904029   .0192183     4.70   0.000      .052728    .1280777 
      drug25 |  -1.257087   .0219797   -57.19   0.000    -1.300175   -1.213999 
      drug26 |  -1.015056   .0311714   -32.56   0.000    -1.076164   -.9539489 
      drug27 |  -1.565534   .0989576   -15.82   0.000    -1.759527   -1.371541 
      drug28 |  -1.946037   .0150807  -129.04   0.000    -1.975601   -1.916473 
      drug29 |  -4.584397   .0140168  -327.06   0.000    -4.611875   -4.556918 
      drug30 |   .5060018   .0094763    53.40   0.000     .4874248    .5245789 
      drug31 |  -3.169093   .0096308  -329.06   0.000    -3.187973   -3.150213 
      drug32 |  -3.514334   .0207674  -169.22   0.000    -3.555045   -3.473622 
      drug33 |  -2.973235   .0105299  -282.36   0.000    -2.993878   -2.952593 
      drug34 |  -4.164655    .008904  -467.73   0.000     -4.18211     -4.1472 
      drug35 |  -4.587265   .0123362  -371.86   0.000    -4.611449   -4.563082 
      drug36 |   -.790091   .0140769   -56.13   0.000    -.8176868   -.7624951 
      drug37 |  -.3180133   .0092303   -34.45   0.000     -.336108   -.2999185 
      drug38 |   1.876656   .3634283     5.16   0.000     1.164204    2.589108 
      drug39 |  -1.949321   .0287602   -67.78   0.000    -2.005702   -1.892941 
      drug40 |  -.0539281   .0161459    -3.34   0.001    -.0855798   -.0222763 
      drug41 |  -.9879428   .0095992  -102.92   0.000    -1.006761   -.9691248 
      drug42 |  -3.983419   .0098794  -403.20   0.000    -4.002786   -3.964051   23
      drug43 |  -3.374512   .0116816  -288.87   0.000    -3.397412   -3.351612 
      drug44 |  -4.066363   .0085229  -477.11   0.000    -4.083071   -4.049655 
      drug45 |  -4.063714   .0133109  -305.29   0.000    -4.089808   -4.037619 
      drug46 |   -.645858   .0129643   -49.82   0.000    -.6712727   -.6204432 
      drug47 |   .2043898   .0173437    11.78   0.000     .1703898    .2383899 
      drug48 |   -4.27634   .0108578  -393.85   0.000    -4.297625   -4.255054 
      drug49 |   1.067576   .1796458     5.94   0.000     .7154051    1.419748 
      drug50 |  -2.562369   .0118583  -216.08   0.000    -2.585616   -2.539123 
      drug51 |  -1.551582   .0121523  -127.68   0.000    -1.575404   -1.527759 
      drug52 |   1.086123   .0083284   130.41   0.000     1.069796    1.102449 
      drug53 |  -.4997754   .0099135   -50.41   0.000    -.5192095   -.4803414 
      drug54 |  -.5312374   .0124582   -42.64   0.000      -.55566   -.5068148 
      drug55 |  -2.922354   .0118087  -247.47   0.000    -2.945503   -2.899204 
      drug56 |    1.37354   .0214483    64.04   0.000     1.331493    1.415586 
      drug57 |  -1.262043   .0103086  -122.43   0.000    -1.282251   -1.241834 
      drug58 |    2.67766   .0099918   267.99   0.000     2.658072    2.697247 
      drug59 |   3.719948   .0105767   351.71   0.000     3.699214    3.740682 
      drug60 |  -4.641267   .0132655  -349.88   0.000    -4.667272   -4.615262 
      drug61 |  -3.315048   .0095249  -348.04   0.000    -3.333721   -3.296376 
      drug62 |  -3.339985   .0118625  -281.56   0.000     -3.36324   -3.316731 
      drug63 |  -.4396876   .0081908   -53.68   0.000    -.4557447   -.4236306 
      drug64 |  -4.836603   .0126927  -381.05   0.000    -4.861486   -4.811721 
      drug65 |   2.316317   .0862683    26.85   0.000       2.1472    2.485435 
      drug66 |  -.7146585   .0137181   -52.10   0.000     -.741551    -.687766 
      drug67 |   3.314119   .0727712    45.54   0.000     3.171461    3.456777 
      drug68 |  -.7801151   .0111608   -69.90   0.000    -.8019942   -.7582359 
      drug69 |  -3.564098   .0143805  -247.84   0.000    -3.592289   -3.535907 
      drug70 |  -.4325102   .0687193    -6.29   0.000    -.5672252   -.2977953 
      drug71 |  -1.866399   .0097092  -192.23   0.000    -1.885433   -1.847366 
      drug72 |  -.5040115   .0163011   -30.92   0.000    -.5359676   -.4720555 
      drug73 |   6.605436   .0276082   239.26   0.000     6.551314    6.659558 
      drug74 |  -2.419718   .0124577  -194.23   0.000     -2.44414   -2.395297 
      drug75 |  -2.084197    .009074  -229.69   0.000    -2.101985   -2.066408 
      drug76 |  -3.694298   .0146621  -251.96   0.000    -3.723041   -3.665555 
      drug77 |   .1037097   .0152011     6.82   0.000       .07391    .1335093 
      drug78 |   3.304044    .018963   174.24   0.000      3.26687    3.341219 
      drug79 |  -3.893479   .0096407  -403.86   0.000    -3.912379    -3.87458 
      drug80 |  -1.210858    .007939  -152.52   0.000    -1.226421   -1.195295 
      drug81 |  -2.370689   .1018381   -23.28   0.000    -2.570329    -2.17105 
      drug82 |  -.2474393   .0126145   -19.62   0.000    -.2721684   -.2227103 
      drug83 |   2.228096   .1489024    14.96   0.000     1.936193    2.519999 





               
variable name       description 
----------------------------------------------------- 
lap                 log average brand price 
dag                 =1 if AG on market 
ldag                =1 if dag[t-1]==1 
aggshare20          =1 if  0% < aggshare <= 20% 
aggshare40          =1 if 20% < aggshare <= 40% 
aggshare60          =1 if 40% < aggshare <= 60% 
aggshare80          =1 if 60% < aggshare <= 80% 
aggshare100         =1 if 80% < aggshare <= 100% 
laggshare20         =1 if  0% < aggshare[t-1] <= 20% 
laggshare40         =1 if 20% < aggshare[t-1] <= 40% 
laggshare60         =1 if 40% < aggshare[t-1] <= 60% 
laggshare80         =1 if 60% < aggshare[t-1] <= 80% 
laggshare100        =1 if 80% < aggshare[t-1] <= 100% 
ldtotgen1           =1 if number of IGs[t-1] = 1  
ldtotgen2           =1 if number of IGs[t-1] = 2  
ldtotgen3           =1 if number of IGs[t-1] = 3  
ldtotgen4           =1 if number of IGs[t-1] = 4  
ldtotgen5           =1 if number of IGs[t-1] = 5  
ldtotgen6           =1 if number of IGs[t-1] = 6  
ldtotgen7           =1 if number of IGs[t-1] = 7  
ldtotgen8           =1 if number of IGs[t-1] = 8  
ldtotgen9           =1 if number of IGs[t-1] = 9  
ldtotgen10          =1 if number of IGs[t-1] = 10 
ldtotgen11          =1 if number of IGs[t-1] = 11 
drug2               drugid==AMCINONIDE 
drug3               drugid==AMIODARONE 
drug4               drugid==AMIODARONE INJ 
drug5               drugid==BETAXOLOL 
drug6               drugid==BISOPROLOL 
drug7               drugid==BRIMONIDINE 
drug8               drugid==BUTORPHANOL 
drug9               drugid==CALCITONIN (SALMON)   24
drug10              drugid==CARVEDILOL 
drug11              drugid==CEFADROXIL 
drug12              drugid==CEFUROXIME AXETIL 
drug13              drugid==CEFUROXIME AXETIL LIQUID 
drug14              drugid==CIPROFLOXACIN 
drug15              drugid==CIPROFLOXACIN LIQUID 
drug16              drugid==CITALOPRAM 
drug17              drugid==CLAVULANIC ACID 
drug18              drugid==CLAVULANIC ACID LIQUID 
drug19              drugid==CLINDAMYCIN 
drug20              drugid==CLINDAMYCIN INJ 
drug21              drugid==CLINDAMYCIN LIQUID 
drug22              drugid==CLOBAZAM 
drug23              drugid==CLOZAPINE 
drug24              drugid==COLISTIN 
drug25              drugid==CYCLOSPORINE 
drug26              drugid==CYCLOSPORINE INJ 
drug27              drugid==CYCLOSPORINE LIQUID 
drug28              drugid==DEFEROXAMINE 
drug29              drugid==DIVALPROEX 
drug30              drugid==DOXAZOSIN 
drug31              drugid==ETIDRONIC ACID 
drug32              drugid==FENOFIBRATE 
drug33              drugid==FENOFIBRATE MICRO 
drug34              drugid==FLAVOXATE 
drug35              drugid==FLOCTAFENINE 
drug36              drugid==FLUCONAZOLE 
drug37              drugid==FLUCONAZOLE 150MG 
drug38              drugid==FLUCONAZOLE INJ 
drug39              drugid==FLUCONAZOLE LIQUID 
drug40              drugid==FLUNARIZINE 
drug41              drugid==FOSINOPRIL 
drug42              drugid==GABAPENTIN 
drug43              drugid==GLICLAZIDE 
drug44              drugid==HYDROXYCHLOROQUINE 
drug45              drugid==HYDROXYUREA 
drug46              drugid==KETOROLAC 
drug47              drugid==KETOROLAC INJ 
drug48              drugid==LABETALOL 
drug49              drugid==LABETALOL INJ 
drug50              drugid==LAMOTRIGINE 
drug51              drugid==LAMOTRIGINE CHEWABLE 
drug52              drugid==LEFLUNOMIDE 
drug53              drugid==LORATADINE 
drug54              drugid==MELOXICAM 
drug55              drugid==METHAZOLAMIDE 
drug56              drugid==MIDAZOLAM 
drug57              drugid==MIRTAZAPINE 
drug58              drugid==MISOPROSTOL 
drug59              drugid==MOMETASONE 
drug60              drugid==NABUMETONE 
drug61              drugid==NEFAZODONE 
drug62              drugid==NORFLOXACIN 
drug63              drugid==OMEPRAZOLE 
drug64              drugid==OXAPROZIN 
drug65              drugid==PAMIDRONIC ACID 
drug66              drugid==PAROXETINE 
drug67              drugid==PIPERACILLIN 
drug68              drugid==PRAVASTATIN 
drug69              drugid==PROPAFENONE 
drug70              drugid==PROPOFOL 
drug71              drugid==SERTRALINE 
drug72              drugid==SIMVASTATIN 
drug73              drugid==SUFENTANIL 
drug74              drugid==TERBINAFINE 
drug75              drugid==TERCONAZOLE 
drug76              drugid==TICLOPIDINE 
drug77              drugid==TIZANIDINE 
drug78              drugid==TRIFLURIDINE 
drug79              drugid==TRIMEBUTINE 
drug80              drugid==VANCOMYCIN 
drug81              drugid==VANCOMYCIN INJ 
drug82              drugid==WARFARIN 
drug83              drugid==WARFARIN INJ 
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Model 1.2 
 Model specification: 
      All drug markets used 
      Indicators of contemporaneous AG generic market share  
      Indicators of total number of generic drugs introduced 
      Drug market specific indicators 
      Quarter of year indicator variables dropped 
      Robust standard error estimator used 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    6021 
                                                       F( 97,  5922) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9913 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .24313 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
         lap |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  aggshare20 |  -.0105929   .0136842    -0.77   0.439    -.0374189    .0162331 
  aggshare40 |  -.0522137   .0115961    -4.50   0.000    -.0749463   -.0294812 
  aggshare60 |  -.0542677   .0126691    -4.28   0.000    -.0791037   -.0294317 
  aggshare80 |  -.0358775   .0143117    -2.51   0.012    -.0639335   -.0078214 
 aggshare100 |  -.1090576   .0108704   -10.03   0.000    -.1303675   -.0877477 
   ldtotgen1 |  -.1177324   .0136421    -8.63   0.000     -.144476   -.0909888 
   ldtotgen2 |  -.1989836   .0129264   -15.39   0.000     -.224324   -.1736432 
   ldtotgen3 |  -.2536046   .0159592   -15.89   0.000    -.2848905   -.2223188 
   ldtotgen4 |  -.2694731   .0122699   -21.96   0.000    -.2935266   -.2454196 
   ldtotgen5 |  -.3099103   .0131406   -23.58   0.000    -.3356707     -.28415 
   ldtotgen6 |  -.2779776   .0192726   -14.42   0.000     -.315759   -.2401963 
   ldtotgen7 |  -.3318518   .0146718   -22.62   0.000    -.3606138   -.3030898 
   ldtotgen8 |  -.3496621   .0171132   -20.43   0.000    -.3832102    -.316114 
   ldtotgen9 |  -.4077835   .0177947   -22.92   0.000    -.4426676   -.3728994 
  ldtotgen10 |  -.5605023   .0146102   -38.36   0.000    -.5891437   -.5318609 
  ldtotgen11 |  -.5654369    .014886   -37.98   0.000    -.5946189   -.5362548 
       drug2 |   3.429279   .0089652   382.51   0.000     3.411704    3.446854 
       drug3 |   -2.86251   .0104349  -274.32   0.000    -2.882966   -2.842053 
       drug4 |   1.197134   .0905085    13.23   0.000     1.019704    1.374563 
       drug5 |   4.192197   .0106819   392.46   0.000     4.171256    4.213137 
       drug6 |  -.6420058   .0083677   -76.72   0.000    -.6584095    -.625602 
       drug7 |   4.756508   .0097239   489.16   0.000     4.737445     4.77557 
       drug8 |   2.576453   .0230295   111.88   0.000     2.531307    2.621599 
       drug9 |  -2.636428    .028884   -91.28   0.000    -2.693051   -2.579805 
      drug10 |  -.4756078   .0106807   -44.53   0.000    -.4965459   -.4546697 
      drug11 |   -4.09965    .011384  -360.12   0.000    -4.121967   -4.077334 
      drug12 |  -3.326335    .010132  -328.30   0.000    -3.346198   -3.306473 
      drug13 |  -4.623513   .0216556  -213.50   0.000    -4.665966    -4.58106 
      drug14 |   -3.29026   .0105161  -312.88   0.000    -3.310875   -3.269645 
      drug15 |  -5.053669   .0084066  -601.15   0.000    -5.070149   -5.037189 
      drug16 |  -1.008959   .0104552   -96.50   0.000    -1.029455    -.988463 
      drug17 |  -3.980263   .0121731  -326.97   0.000    -4.004126   -3.956399 
      drug18 |  -5.183275    .009052  -572.61   0.000    -5.201021    -5.16553 
      drug19 |  -3.394211   .0109229  -310.74   0.000    -3.415624   -3.372799 
      drug20 |  -2.766091   .0452021   -61.19   0.000    -2.854703   -2.677478 
      drug21 |  -4.541867   .0122656  -370.29   0.000    -4.565912   -4.517822 
      drug22 |  -1.418962   .0114887  -123.51   0.000    -1.441484    -1.39644 
      drug23 |  -1.513451    .010434  -145.05   0.000    -1.533905   -1.492997 
      drug24 |   .0908014   .0192193     4.72   0.000     .0531245    .1284783 
      drug25 |  -1.255388   .0218897   -57.35   0.000      -1.2983   -1.212476 
      drug26 |  -1.015601   .0311628   -32.59   0.000    -1.076691   -.9545104 
      drug27 |  -1.564483   .0989786   -15.81   0.000    -1.758517   -1.370449 
      drug28 |  -1.945167   .0151425  -128.46   0.000    -1.974852   -1.915482 
      drug29 |  -4.586229   .0141653  -323.76   0.000    -4.613998    -4.55846 
      drug30 |   .5071197   .0094278    53.79   0.000     .4886378    .5256017 
      drug31 |  -3.169349   .0096148  -329.63   0.000    -3.188198   -3.150501 
      drug32 |  -3.512637   .0208007  -168.87   0.000    -3.553414    -3.47186 
      drug33 |  -2.974646   .0105846  -281.04   0.000    -2.995395   -2.953896 
      drug34 |   -4.16377   .0088913  -468.30   0.000      -4.1812    -4.14634 
      drug35 |  -4.587113   .0122424  -374.69   0.000    -4.611112   -4.563113 
      drug36 |  -.7892319   .0140721   -56.08   0.000    -.8168183   -.7616454 
      drug37 |  -.3177196    .009234   -34.41   0.000    -.3358216   -.2996177 
      drug38 |   1.876311   .3634578     5.16   0.000     1.163801    2.588821 
      drug39 |  -1.949866   .0287508   -67.82   0.000    -2.006228   -1.893504 
      drug40 |  -.0537035   .0160927    -3.34   0.001    -.0852509    -.022156 
      drug41 |  -.9884011   .0096051  -102.90   0.000    -1.007231   -.9695716 
      drug42 |  -3.983983   .0099427  -400.69   0.000    -4.003474   -3.964491 
      drug43 |  -3.379436   .0115724  -292.03   0.000    -3.402122   -3.356749 
      drug44 |   -4.06628    .008486  -479.17   0.000    -4.082915   -4.049644 
      drug45 |  -4.063055   .0132263  -307.19   0.000    -4.088984   -4.037127 
      drug46 |  -.6430602   .0130039   -49.45   0.000    -.6685525   -.6175679 
      drug47 |   .2057248    .017307    11.89   0.000     .1717968    .2396529   26
      drug48 |  -4.275899    .010812  -395.48   0.000    -4.297094   -4.254703 
      drug49 |   1.068229   .1796112     5.95   0.000     .7161254    1.420332 
      drug50 |  -2.562973   .0118708  -215.91   0.000    -2.586244   -2.539702 
      drug51 |  -1.552126   .0121302  -127.96   0.000    -1.575906   -1.528347 
      drug52 |   1.085651   .0083073   130.69   0.000     1.069365    1.101936 
      drug53 |  -.4994066   .0099429   -50.23   0.000    -.5188983   -.4799149 
      drug54 |  -.5318038    .012967   -41.01   0.000    -.5572239   -.5063837 
      drug55 |  -2.922249   .0117665  -248.35   0.000    -2.945316   -2.899182 
      drug56 |    1.37662   .0214047    64.31   0.000     1.334659    1.418581 
      drug57 |  -1.261782   .0103467  -121.95   0.000    -1.282066   -1.241499 
      drug58 |   2.676545   .0100342   266.74   0.000     2.656875    2.696216 
      drug59 |   3.719556   .0105187   353.61   0.000     3.698935    3.740176 
      drug60 |  -4.638484   .0133447  -347.59   0.000    -4.664645   -4.612324 
      drug61 |  -3.317023   .0096558  -343.53   0.000    -3.335951   -3.298094 
      drug62 |  -3.336692   .0118492  -281.60   0.000    -3.359921   -3.313464 
      drug63 |  -.4399919   .0081819   -53.78   0.000    -.4560314   -.4239524 
      drug64 |  -4.835942    .012752  -379.23   0.000    -4.860941   -4.810943 
      drug65 |   2.316373   .0864238    26.80   0.000     2.146951    2.485795 
      drug66 |  -.7148425   .0137109   -52.14   0.000    -.7417208   -.6879642 
      drug67 |   3.314073   .0727775    45.54   0.000     3.171403    3.456744 
      drug68 |  -.7814533   .0114489   -68.26   0.000    -.8038973   -.7590094 
      drug69 |  -3.566118   .0143731  -248.11   0.000    -3.594294   -3.537941 
      drug70 |   -.430422   .0687178    -6.26   0.000     -.565134     -.29571 
      drug71 |  -1.868536   .0096466  -193.70   0.000    -1.887446   -1.849625 
      drug72 |  -.5036286   .0161735   -31.14   0.000    -.5353345   -.4719226 
      drug73 |   6.605944   .0276234   239.14   0.000     6.551792    6.660096 
      drug74 |  -2.421016   .0123109  -196.66   0.000     -2.44515   -2.396882 
      drug75 |  -2.084717    .009048  -230.41   0.000    -2.102455    -2.06698 
      drug76 |  -3.690633   .0145974  -252.83   0.000    -3.719249   -3.662017 
      drug77 |    .103165   .0151834     6.79   0.000        .0734    .1329301 
      drug78 |   3.303716   .0189645   174.21   0.000     3.266539    3.340893 
      drug79 |  -3.893447    .009637  -404.01   0.000    -3.912339   -3.874555 
      drug80 |  -1.211402   .0079052  -153.24   0.000    -1.226899   -1.195905 
      drug81 |  -2.367788   .1018102   -23.26   0.000    -2.567373   -2.168203 
      drug82 |  -.2457044   .0126145   -19.48   0.000    -.2704334   -.2209753 
      drug83 |   2.227551   .1489006    14.96   0.000     1.935652    2.519451 
       _cons |  -1.603677   .0076633  -209.27   0.000      -1.6187   -1.588654 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Model 1.3 
Model specification: 
      Drug markets with apparent measurement error removed 
      Indicators of one period lagged AG generic market share  
      Indicators of total number of generic drugs introduced 
      Drug market specific indicators 
      Quarter of year indicator variables dropped 
      Robust standard error estimator used 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    4931 
                                                       F( 78,  4851) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9984 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .10427 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
         lap |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 laggshare20 |  -.0250899    .012511    -2.01   0.045     -.049617   -.0005628 
 laggshare40 |  -.0687131   .0084515    -8.13   0.000    -.0852817   -.0521444 
 laggshare60 |   -.066947   .0082947    -8.07   0.000    -.0832084   -.0506856 
 laggshare80 |  -.0535387   .0109299    -4.90   0.000    -.0749661   -.0321112 
laggshare100 |  -.1085286   .0104509   -10.38   0.000     -.129017   -.0880401 
   ldtotgen1 |  -.1154129   .0062483   -18.47   0.000    -.1276624   -.1031634 
   ldtotgen2 |  -.1998336    .007496   -26.66   0.000    -.2145291   -.1851381 
   ldtotgen3 |   -.219235   .0077548   -28.27   0.000    -.2344379   -.2040321 
   ldtotgen4 |  -.2563404   .0091505   -28.01   0.000    -.2742795   -.2384014 
   ldtotgen5 |  -.2951241   .0105049   -28.09   0.000    -.3157185   -.2745298 
   ldtotgen6 |  -.2614242   .0175769   -14.87   0.000    -.2958829   -.2269654 
   ldtotgen7 |  -.3179284   .0129441   -24.56   0.000    -.3433048    -.292552 
   ldtotgen8 |  -.3353393   .0160302   -20.92   0.000    -.3667657   -.3039129 
   ldtotgen9 |  -.3976185   .0175061   -22.71   0.000    -.4319384   -.3632986 
  ldtotgen10 |  -.5572985   .0148967   -37.41   0.000    -.5865029   -.5280942 
  ldtotgen11 |  -.5622331   .0151673   -37.07   0.000    -.5919678   -.5324983 
       drug2 |   3.429628   .0088644   386.90   0.000     3.412249    3.447006 
       drug3 |  -2.863683   .0104299  -274.56   0.000     -2.88413   -2.843235 
       drug4 |  (dropped) 
       drug5 |   4.191028   .0091422   458.43   0.000     4.173105    4.208951 
       drug6 |  -.6422252   .0083619   -76.80   0.000    -.6586183   -.6258321 
       drug7 |    4.75491   .0097303   488.67   0.000     4.735834    4.773986 
       drug8 |   2.576388   .0228519   112.74   0.000     2.531588    2.621188 
       drug9 |  -2.643734   .0271156   -97.50   0.000    -2.696893   -2.590575 
      drug10 |  -.4785822   .0106185   -45.07   0.000    -.4993993   -.4577651 
      drug11 |  -4.092119   .0112189  -364.75   0.000    -4.114113   -4.070125 
      drug12 |  -3.322148   .0097714  -339.99   0.000    -3.341304   -3.302991 
      drug13 |  (dropped) 
      drug14 |  -3.290371   .0101746  -323.39   0.000    -3.310318   -3.270425 
      drug15 |  (dropped) 
      drug16 |  -1.008902   .0101901   -99.01   0.000    -1.028879   -.9889243 
      drug17 |   -3.97426   .0118716  -334.77   0.000    -3.997534   -3.950986 
      drug18 |  (dropped) 
      drug19 |  -3.397835   .0104677  -324.60   0.000    -3.418357   -3.377314 
      drug20 |  (dropped) 
      drug21 |  (dropped) 
      drug22 |  -1.419217   .0107626  -131.87   0.000    -1.440316   -1.398117 
      drug23 |  -1.513489   .0104364  -145.02   0.000    -1.533949   -1.493029 
      drug24 |    .090045   .0189407     4.75   0.000     .0529125    .1271774 
      drug25 |  -1.257338   .0212384   -59.20   0.000    -1.298975   -1.215701 
      drug26 |  (dropped) 
      drug27 |  (dropped) 
      drug28 |  -1.946472   .0137951  -141.10   0.000    -1.973516   -1.919427 
      drug29 |  -4.581994    .013702  -334.40   0.000    -4.608856   -4.555132 
      drug30 |   .5060398   .0093887    53.90   0.000     .4876337     .524446 
      drug31 |  -3.169344   .0095927  -330.39   0.000     -3.18815   -3.150538 
      drug32 |  (dropped) 
      drug33 |  -2.974267   .0105455  -282.04   0.000    -2.994941   -2.953593 
      drug34 |  -4.172583   .0083274  -501.07   0.000    -4.188908   -4.156257 
      drug35 |  -4.587583   .0121986  -376.07   0.000    -4.611498   -4.563668 
      drug36 |  -.7965055   .0131938   -60.37   0.000    -.8223713   -.7706397 
      drug37 |   -.319436   .0090024   -35.48   0.000    -.3370848   -.3017873 
      drug38 |  (dropped) 
      drug39 |  (dropped) 
      drug40 |  -.0542577   .0159906    -3.39   0.001    -.0856065   -.0229088 
      drug41 |  -.9873014   .0093753  -105.31   0.000    -1.005681   -.9689216 
      drug42 |  -3.983799    .009486  -419.96   0.000    -4.002396   -3.965202 
      drug43 |   -3.37712   .0110202  -306.45   0.000    -3.398725   -3.355516 
      drug44 |  -4.066488   .0084677  -480.23   0.000    -4.083088   -4.049887 
      drug45 |  -4.063469   .0129194  -314.52   0.000    -4.088797   -4.038141 
      drug46 |  -.6465993   .0103117   -62.71   0.000     -.666815   -.6263837 
      drug47 |  (dropped)   28
      drug48 |  -4.276704    .010256  -417.00   0.000    -4.296811   -4.256598 
      drug49 |  (dropped) 
      drug50 |  -2.562644   .0118294  -216.63   0.000    -2.585835   -2.539453 
      drug51 |  (dropped) 
      drug52 |   1.085906    .008081   134.38   0.000     1.070064    1.101749 
      drug53 |  -.5001285   .0093928   -53.25   0.000    -.5185426   -.4817144 
      drug54 |  -.5297909     .01234   -42.93   0.000    -.5539828   -.5055989 
      drug55 |  -2.922664   .0117077  -249.64   0.000    -2.945616   -2.899711 
      drug56 |   1.362701   .0206438    66.01   0.000     1.322229    1.403172 
      drug57 |  -1.261771   .0103118  -122.36   0.000    -1.281987   -1.241555 
      drug58 |   2.682531   .0091293   293.84   0.000     2.664633    2.700428 
      drug59 |    3.72053   .0104531   355.93   0.000     3.700037    3.741023 
      drug60 |  -4.656806   .0104594  -445.23   0.000    -4.677311   -4.636301 
      drug61 |  -3.314236   .0093734  -353.58   0.000    -3.332612    -3.29586 
      drug62 |  -3.345091   .0106155  -315.12   0.000    -3.365902    -3.32428 
      drug63 |  -.4399313   .0081176   -54.19   0.000    -.4558455   -.4240171 
      drug64 |  -4.835949   .0125915  -384.07   0.000    -4.860634   -4.811264 
      drug65 |   2.318381   .0863028    26.86   0.000     2.149188    2.487573 
      drug66 |  -.7155094   .0133825   -53.47   0.000    -.7417452   -.6892737 
      drug67 |  (dropped) 
      drug68 |  -.7805302   .0108418   -71.99   0.000    -.8017849   -.7592754 
      drug69 |   -3.55916   .0140885  -252.63   0.000     -3.58678    -3.53154 
      drug70 |  (dropped) 
      drug71 |  -1.863737   .0095944  -194.25   0.000    -1.882547   -1.844928 
      drug72 |  -.5064923   .0165345   -30.63   0.000    -.5389075   -.4740771 
      drug73 |   6.605061   .0273482   241.52   0.000     6.551446    6.658676 
      drug74 |   -2.42787   .0111934  -216.90   0.000    -2.449814   -2.405925 
      drug75 |  -2.084405   .0087793  -237.42   0.000    -2.101617   -2.067194 
      drug76 |  -3.703824   .0139771  -264.99   0.000    -3.731225   -3.676422 
      drug77 |  (dropped) 
      drug78 |   3.303804     .01892   174.62   0.000     3.266713    3.340896 
      drug79 |  -3.893778   .0095614  -407.24   0.000    -3.912522   -3.875033 
      drug80 |  -1.211062   .0075566  -160.27   0.000    -1.225877   -1.196248 
      drug81 |  (dropped) 
      drug82 |  -.2542743   .0120617   -21.08   0.000    -.2779208   -.2306278 
      drug83 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |  -1.604017   .0073033  -219.63   0.000    -1.618335   -1.589699 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Model 1.4 
Model specification: 
      Drug markets with apparent measurement error removed 
      Indicators of contemporaneous AG generic market share  
      Indicators of total number of generic drugs introduced 
      Drug market specific indicators 
      Quarter of year indicator variables dropped 
      Robust standard error estimator used 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    4931 
                                                       F( 78,  4851) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9984 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .10437 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
         lap |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  aggshare20 |  -.0210724   .0127095    -1.66   0.097    -.0459887     .003844 
  aggshare40 |  -.0612468   .0086204    -7.10   0.000    -.0781468   -.0443469 
  aggshare60 |  -.0604142   .0084447    -7.15   0.000    -.0769696   -.0438588 
  aggshare80 |  -.0409022   .0104166    -3.93   0.000    -.0613234    -.020481 
 aggshare100 |  -.1086218   .0096326   -11.28   0.000    -.1275061   -.0897375 
   ldtotgen1 |  -.1174343   .0062876   -18.68   0.000    -.1297609   -.1051078 
   ldtotgen2 |  -.2039383   .0075801   -26.90   0.000    -.2187988   -.1890779 
   ldtotgen3 |  -.2242902    .007813   -28.71   0.000    -.2396071   -.2089732 
   ldtotgen4 |  -.2611748   .0092339   -28.28   0.000    -.2792775   -.2430721 
   ldtotgen5 |  -.3009351   .0105722   -28.46   0.000    -.3216613   -.2802088 
   ldtotgen6 |  -.2674645   .0177035   -15.11   0.000    -.3021714   -.2327576 
   ldtotgen7 |  -.3228255   .0129235   -24.98   0.000    -.3481614   -.2974896 
   ldtotgen8 |  -.3407293   .0162714   -20.94   0.000    -.3726285     -.30883 
   ldtotgen9 |  -.3999904   .0173976   -22.99   0.000    -.4340976   -.3658832 
  ldtotgen10 |  -.5583134   .0147698   -37.80   0.000    -.5872689   -.5293579 
  ldtotgen11 |  -.5632479   .0150426   -37.44   0.000    -.5927383   -.5337576 
       drug2 |   3.429904   .0089333   383.94   0.000     3.412391    3.447417 
       drug3 |  -2.864482   .0103778  -276.02   0.000    -2.884828   -2.844137 
       drug4 |  (dropped) 
       drug5 |   4.191755   .0091624   457.50   0.000     4.173792    4.209717 
       drug6 |  -.6421497    .008326   -77.13   0.000    -.6584724   -.6258269 
       drug7 |   4.756092   .0096714   491.77   0.000     4.737132    4.775052 
       drug8 |    2.57767   .0228069   113.02   0.000     2.532958    2.622382 
       drug9 |  -2.640238    .027155   -97.23   0.000    -2.693474   -2.587002 
      drug10 |  -.4782689   .0105897   -45.16   0.000    -.4990296   -.4575081 
      drug11 |  -4.095683   .0109711  -373.31   0.000    -4.117191   -4.074175 
      drug12 |  -3.324103   .0097517  -340.87   0.000    -3.343221   -3.304985 
      drug13 |  (dropped) 
      drug14 |   -3.29052   .0101979  -322.67   0.000    -3.310513   -3.270527 
      drug15 |  (dropped) 
      drug16 |  -1.008953    .010194   -98.98   0.000    -1.028937   -.9889679 
      drug17 |   -3.97703   .0118505  -335.60   0.000    -4.000262   -3.953797 
      drug18 |  (dropped) 
      drug19 |  -3.399145   .0106675  -318.64   0.000    -3.420058   -3.378231 
      drug20 |  (dropped) 
      drug21 |  (dropped) 
      drug22 |  -1.421188   .0106625  -133.29   0.000    -1.442091   -1.400285 
      drug23 |  -1.513514   .0104698  -144.56   0.000     -1.53404   -1.492989 
      drug24 |   .0904123   .0189364     4.77   0.000     .0532884    .1275362 
      drug25 |  -1.255897   .0212387   -59.13   0.000    -1.297535    -1.21426 
      drug26 |  (dropped) 
      drug27 |  (dropped) 
      drug28 |  -1.945627    .013837  -140.61   0.000    -1.972753     -1.9185 
      drug29 |  -4.583867    .013799  -332.19   0.000    -4.610919   -4.556815 
      drug30 |   .5075391   .0093322    54.39   0.000     .4892438    .5258344 
      drug31 |   -3.16964   .0095762  -330.99   0.000    -3.188414   -3.150867 
      drug32 |  (dropped) 
      drug33 |  -2.975684   .0105736  -281.43   0.000    -2.996413   -2.954956 
      drug34 |   -4.17156   .0082909  -503.15   0.000    -4.187814   -4.155307 
      drug35 |  -4.587465   .0121004  -379.12   0.000    -4.611187   -4.563743 
      drug36 |  -.7953889   .0132043   -60.24   0.000    -.8212753   -.7695025 
      drug37 |  -.3188726    .009023   -35.34   0.000    -.3365617   -.3011835 
      drug38 |  (dropped) 
      drug39 |  (dropped) 
      drug40 |  -.0540666   .0159335    -3.39   0.001    -.0853034   -.0228298 
      drug41 |  -.9876824   .0093619  -105.50   0.000    -1.006036   -.9693287 
      drug42 |  -3.984374    .009552  -417.12   0.000      -4.0031   -3.965648 
      drug43 |  -3.382046   .0107469  -314.70   0.000    -3.403115   -3.360978 
      drug44 |  -4.066417   .0084293  -482.41   0.000    -4.082942   -4.049891 
      drug45 |  -4.062758   .0128179  -316.96   0.000    -4.087887   -4.037629 
      drug46 |  -.6432536   .0103788   -61.98   0.000    -.6636007   -.6229064 
      drug47 |  (dropped)   30
      drug48 |  -4.276294    .010195  -419.45   0.000    -4.296281   -4.256307 
      drug49 |  (dropped) 
      drug50 |  -2.563089   .0118475  -216.34   0.000    -2.586315   -2.539862 
      drug51 |  (dropped) 
      drug52 |   1.085392   .0080543   134.76   0.000     1.069602    1.101182 
      drug53 |  -.4997912   .0094145   -53.09   0.000    -.5182479   -.4813346 
      drug54 |  -.5302009   .0128379   -41.30   0.000     -.555369   -.5050327 
      drug55 |  -2.922594   .0116631  -250.58   0.000    -2.945459   -2.899729 
      drug56 |   1.366066   .0205686    66.42   0.000     1.325742     1.40639 
      drug57 |  -1.261438    .010363  -121.73   0.000    -1.281754   -1.241122 
      drug58 |   2.681419   .0091142   294.20   0.000     2.663551    2.699287 
      drug59 |   3.720116   .0103533   359.32   0.000     3.699819    3.740413 
      drug60 |   -4.65371   .0105557  -440.87   0.000    -4.674404   -4.633016 
      drug61 |  -3.316207   .0094934  -349.32   0.000    -3.334818   -3.297595 
      drug62 |   -3.34142   .0106104  -314.92   0.000    -3.362221   -3.320619 
      drug63 |   -.440276   .0081077   -54.30   0.000    -.4561708   -.4243812 
      drug64 |  -4.835184    .012664  -381.80   0.000    -4.860011   -4.810357 
      drug65 |    2.31856    .086477    26.81   0.000     2.149026    2.488094 
      drug66 |  -.7156838   .0133707   -53.53   0.000    -.7418964   -.6894712 
      drug67 |  (dropped) 
      drug68 |  -.7819502   .0111049   -70.42   0.000    -.8037207   -.7601796 
      drug69 |  -3.561285   .0140689  -253.13   0.000    -3.588866   -3.533703 
      drug70 |  (dropped) 
      drug71 |  -1.866035   .0095125  -196.17   0.000    -1.884684   -1.847386 
      drug72 |  -.5060657   .0163938   -30.87   0.000    -.5382051   -.4739263 
      drug73 |   6.605538   .0273584   241.44   0.000     6.551903    6.659173 
      drug74 |  -2.429198   .0110348  -220.14   0.000    -2.450831   -2.407565 
      drug75 |  -2.084969   .0087464  -238.38   0.000    -2.102116   -2.067822 
      drug76 |  -3.699753   .0139224  -265.74   0.000    -3.727047   -3.672458 
      drug77 |  (dropped) 
      drug78 |   3.303435   .0189211   174.59   0.000     3.266341    3.340529 
      drug79 |  -3.893781   .0095568  -407.44   0.000    -3.912517   -3.875046 
      drug80 |  -1.211651   .0075129  -161.28   0.000    -1.226379   -1.196922 
      drug81 |  (dropped) 
      drug82 |  -.2522375   .0120597   -20.92   0.000      -.27588   -.2285949 
      drug83 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |  -1.603429   .0072581  -220.92   0.000    -1.617658     -1.5892 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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      All drug markets used 
      Indicators of one period lagged AG generic market share  
      Indicators of total number of generic drugs introduced 
      Drug market specific indicators 
      Quarter of year indicator variables dropped 
      Robust standard error estimator used 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    5851 
                                                       F( 97,  5752) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9908 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .25123 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
        lbap |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 laggshare20 |   .0559338   .0183238     3.05   0.002     .0200122    .0918553 
 laggshare40 |   .0030756   .0128514     0.24   0.811    -.0221179    .0282691 
 laggshare60 |  -.0297272    .012212    -2.43   0.015    -.0536674    -.005787 
 laggshare80 |  -.0250321   .0129111    -1.94   0.053    -.0503427    .0002785 
laggshare100 |    .010653   .0084845     1.26   0.209    -.0059799    .0272858 
   ldtotgen1 |  -.0093424   .0130851    -0.71   0.475    -.0349941    .0163092 
   ldtotgen2 |  -.0049055   .0149745    -0.33   0.743    -.0342612    .0244502 
   ldtotgen3 |   .0081458   .0190863     0.43   0.670    -.0292705    .0455621 
   ldtotgen4 |   .0122816   .0138309     0.89   0.375    -.0148322    .0393954 
   ldtotgen5 |  -.0103949   .0141981    -0.73   0.464    -.0382285    .0174387 
   ldtotgen6 |  -.0090506    .016817    -0.54   0.590    -.0420183    .0239171 
   ldtotgen7 |   .0161695   .0148068     1.09   0.275    -.0128575    .0451964 
   ldtotgen8 |  -.0504284   .0183806    -2.74   0.006    -.0864613   -.0143955 
   ldtotgen9 |  -.0542209   .0195283    -2.78   0.006    -.0925037   -.0159381 
  ldtotgen10 |  -.1444078   .0142261   -10.15   0.000    -.1722964   -.1165193 
  ldtotgen11 |  -.1515666    .014272   -10.62   0.000    -.1795451   -.1235881 
       drug2 |   3.443023   .0119551   288.00   0.000     3.419587     3.46646 
       drug3 |   -2.78537   .0120313  -231.51   0.000    -2.808955   -2.761784 
       drug4 |   .8871435    .254309     3.49   0.000     .3886021    1.385685 
       drug5 |   4.177795   .0130074   321.19   0.000     4.152295    4.203294 
       drug6 |  -.5944186   .0127104   -46.77   0.000    -.6193357   -.5695014 
       drug7 |   4.772518   .0124816   382.36   0.000      4.74805    4.796987 
       drug8 |   2.787629   .0298291    93.45   0.000     2.729153    2.846105 
       drug9 |  -1.033019     .02121   -48.70   0.000    -1.074598    -.991439 
      drug10 |  -.4641923   .0135078   -34.36   0.000    -.4906726    -.437712 
      drug11 |  -4.157622   .0165985  -250.48   0.000    -4.190161   -4.125082 
      drug12 |  -3.249803   .0121041  -268.49   0.000    -3.273532   -3.226075 
      drug13 |  -4.594584   .0232485  -197.63   0.000     -4.64016   -4.549008 
      drug14 |  -3.281638   .0116213  -282.38   0.000     -3.30442   -3.258855 
      drug15 |   -5.02474   .0119166  -421.66   0.000    -5.048101   -5.001379 
      drug16 |  -1.010392   .0123972   -81.50   0.000    -1.034695   -.9860886 
      drug17 |  -3.976778   .0154748  -256.98   0.000    -4.007115   -3.946442 
      drug18 |    -5.1956   .0131083  -396.36   0.000    -5.221297   -5.169903 
      drug19 |  -3.430759   .0178838  -191.84   0.000    -3.465818     -3.3957 
      drug20 |  -3.427962   .0466137   -73.54   0.000    -3.519343   -3.336582 
      drug21 |  -4.512938   .0148936  -303.01   0.000    -4.542135   -4.483741 
      drug22 |  -1.403388   .0134839  -104.08   0.000    -1.429822   -1.376955 
      drug23 |   -1.50797   .0122909  -122.69   0.000    -1.532064   -1.483875 
      drug24 |   .1683544   .0203481     8.27   0.000     .1284645    .2082443 
      drug25 |  -1.053521   .0173147   -60.85   0.000    -1.087464   -1.019577 
      drug26 |  -.9866719   .0322938   -30.55   0.000     -1.04998   -.9233638 
      drug27 |  -1.175967   .0275747   -42.65   0.000    -1.230024    -1.12191 
      drug28 |  -2.000148   .0160905  -124.31   0.000    -2.031692   -1.968605 
      drug29 |   -4.55561   .0160751  -283.40   0.000    -4.587123   -4.524097 
      drug30 |    .518353   .0133062    38.96   0.000     .4922678    .5444382 
      drug31 |  -3.144337   .0125647  -250.25   0.000    -3.168969   -3.119706 
      drug32 |  -2.914179   .0340491   -85.59   0.000    -2.980928    -2.84743 
      drug33 |  -2.937712   .0126092  -232.98   0.000    -2.962431   -2.912993 
      drug34 |  -4.136542   .0127273  -325.01   0.000    -4.161492   -4.111592 
      drug35 |  -4.523372   .0129657  -348.87   0.000     -4.54879   -4.497955 
      drug36 |  -.7342836   .0175511   -41.84   0.000    -.7686903   -.6998769 
      drug37 |  -.3127318   .0130472   -23.97   0.000    -.3383091   -.2871544 
      drug38 |   2.333579   .3960594     5.89   0.000     1.557153    3.110004 
      drug39 |  -1.920937   .0299719   -64.09   0.000    -1.979693   -1.862181 
      drug40 |  -.0587803   .0199623    -2.94   0.003    -.0979139   -.0196468 
      drug41 |  -.9551508   .0121437   -78.65   0.000    -.9789571   -.9313445 
      drug42 |  -3.961661   .0125784  -314.96   0.000     -3.98632   -3.937003 
      drug43 |  -3.385661   .0133355  -253.88   0.000    -3.411804   -3.359519 
      drug44 |  -4.028366   .0115795  -347.89   0.000    -4.051066   -4.005666 
      drug45 |  -4.085842   .0186397  -219.20   0.000    -4.122383   -4.049302   32
      drug46 |  -.6634102   .0175194   -37.87   0.000    -.6977548   -.6290656 
      drug47 |   .1901531   .0208251     9.13   0.000      .149328    .2309782 
      drug48 |  -4.210754   .0131806  -319.47   0.000    -4.236592   -4.184915 
      drug49 |   2.373001    .300763     7.89   0.000     1.783392     2.96261 
      drug50 |  -2.533266   .0145783  -173.77   0.000    -2.561845   -2.504687 
      drug51 |  -1.523197   .0147822  -103.04   0.000    -1.552176   -1.494219 
      drug52 |     1.1125   .0116452    95.53   0.000     1.089671    1.135329 
      drug53 |  -.5107356   .0122158   -41.81   0.000    -.5346832    -.486788 
      drug54 |  -.5167644   .0149592   -34.55   0.000      -.54609   -.4874388 
      drug55 |  -2.828496   .0220283  -128.40   0.000     -2.87168   -2.785312 
      drug56 |   1.526103   .0366979    41.59   0.000     1.454161    1.598044 
      drug57 |  -1.251718   .0118528  -105.61   0.000    -1.274954   -1.228482 
      drug58 |    2.71236    .013825   196.19   0.000     2.685258    2.739462 
      drug59 |   3.731453   .0126012   296.12   0.000      3.70675    3.756156 
      drug60 |  -4.701861   .0156983  -299.51   0.000    -4.732636   -4.671086 
      drug61 |  -3.291904   .0121288  -271.41   0.000    -3.315681   -3.268127 
      drug62 |  -3.304896   .0154808  -213.48   0.000    -3.335245   -3.274548 
      drug63 |  -.4201292   .0112669   -37.29   0.000    -.4422166   -.3980417 
      drug64 |  -4.851578   .0141414  -343.08   0.000    -4.879301   -4.823856 
      drug65 |   2.729626   .0946773    28.83   0.000     2.544022    2.915229 
      drug66 |  -.7026916   .0147765   -47.55   0.000    -.7316591    -.673724 
      drug67 |   3.306012   .0748868    44.15   0.000     3.159206    3.452819 
      drug68 |  -.7325962   .0125488   -58.38   0.000    -.7571965   -.7079958 
      drug69 |  -3.469357   .0156127  -222.21   0.000    -3.499964   -3.438751 
      drug70 |  -.1653174   .1174832    -1.41   0.159    -.3956287    .0649938 
      drug71 |  -1.839823   .0123729  -148.70   0.000    -1.864079   -1.815568 
      drug72 |  -.4708784   .0180187   -26.13   0.000    -.5062018   -.4355551 
      drug73 |   6.648509   .0417862   159.11   0.000     6.566592    6.730425 
      drug74 |  -2.431776   .0136561  -178.07   0.000    -2.458547   -2.405005 
      drug75 |  -2.057044   .0122784  -167.53   0.000    -2.081114   -2.032974 
      drug76 |  -3.620665   .0165256  -219.09   0.000    -3.653061   -3.588268 
      drug77 |   .1321015   .0173766     7.60   0.000     .0980367    .1661662 
      drug78 |   3.321275   .0201994   164.42   0.000     3.281677    3.360874 
      drug79 |  -3.862895    .012898  -299.49   0.000     -3.88818    -3.83761 
      drug80 |  -1.182473   .0115681  -102.22   0.000    -1.205151   -1.159796 
      drug81 |  -2.039128   .1068016   -19.09   0.000    -2.248499   -1.829757 
      drug82 |  -.2776742   .0168242   -16.50   0.000    -.3106559   -.2446924 
      drug83 |    2.25648   .1491759    15.13   0.000     1.964039    2.548921 
       _cons |  -1.632606   .0114042  -143.16   0.000    -1.654963    -1.61025 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Model 2.2 
Model specification: 
      All drug markets used 
      Indicators of contemporaneous AG generic market share  
      Indicators of total number of generic drugs introduced 
      Drug market specific indicators 
      Quarter of year indicator variables dropped 
      Robust standard error estimator used 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    5851 
                                                       F( 97,  5752) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9908 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .25123 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
        lbap |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  aggshare20 |   .0592315   .0183065     3.24   0.001     .0233438    .0951192 
  aggshare40 |   .0062601   .0128695     0.49   0.627    -.0189689    .0314891 
  aggshare60 |  -.0282474   .0124288    -2.27   0.023    -.0526126   -.0038822 
  aggshare80 |  -.0141399   .0129476    -1.09   0.275     -.039522    .0112422 
 aggshare100 |   .0054312   .0076125     0.71   0.476    -.0094921    .0203544 
   ldtotgen1 |  -.0100861   .0132183    -0.76   0.445    -.0359991    .0158268 
   ldtotgen2 |  -.0067755    .015004    -0.45   0.652    -.0361889     .022638 
   ldtotgen3 |   .0057101   .0190748     0.30   0.765    -.0316836    .0431038 
   ldtotgen4 |   .0088987   .0138991     0.64   0.522    -.0183487    .0361461 
   ldtotgen5 |  -.0141709   .0142154    -1.00   0.319    -.0420384    .0136966 
   ldtotgen6 |  -.0130531   .0168377    -0.78   0.438    -.0460614    .0199552 
   ldtotgen7 |   .0134816    .014795     0.91   0.362    -.0155221    .0424854 
   ldtotgen8 |  -.0550646   .0186456    -2.95   0.003     -.091617   -.0185121 
   ldtotgen9 |  -.0561901   .0193611    -2.90   0.004    -.0941452   -.0182351 
  ldtotgen10 |  -.1450488   .0141548   -10.25   0.000    -.1727976   -.1173001 
  ldtotgen11 |  -.1522076   .0142009   -10.72   0.000    -.1800468   -.1243684 
       drug2 |   3.442466   .0119284   288.59   0.000     3.419082     3.46585 
       drug3 |  -2.786113   .0119956  -232.26   0.000    -2.809629   -2.762597 
       drug4 |   .8879709   .2542008     3.49   0.000     .3896416      1.3863 
       drug5 |   4.178041   .0130015   321.35   0.000     4.152553    4.203528 
       drug6 |  -.5943994   .0126915   -46.83   0.000    -.6192796   -.5695192 
       drug7 |   4.773935   .0124452   383.60   0.000     4.749537    4.798332 
       drug8 |   2.788192   .0298577    93.38   0.000      2.72966    2.846724 
       drug9 |  -1.031263   .0211926   -48.66   0.000    -1.072809   -.9897177 
      drug10 |  -.4639415   .0134462   -34.50   0.000    -.4903011   -.4375818 
      drug11 |  -4.158651   .0165107  -251.88   0.000    -4.191018   -4.126284 
      drug12 |  -3.250154   .0120758  -269.15   0.000    -3.273827   -3.226481 
      drug13 |  -4.594822   .0232318  -197.78   0.000    -4.640365   -4.549279 
      drug14 |  -3.282542   .0116076  -282.79   0.000    -3.305298   -3.259787 
      drug15 |  -5.024979   .0118839  -422.84   0.000    -5.048275   -5.001682 
      drug16 |  -1.011457   .0124557   -81.20   0.000    -1.035875    -.987039 
      drug17 |  -3.978743   .0155905  -255.20   0.000    -4.009306   -3.948179 
      drug18 |  -5.196694   .0131216  -396.04   0.000    -5.222417   -5.170971 
      drug19 |  -3.430486   .0179454  -191.16   0.000    -3.465666   -3.395306 
      drug20 |  -3.426815    .046619   -73.51   0.000    -3.518205   -3.335424 
      drug21 |  -4.513176   .0148674  -303.56   0.000    -4.542322   -4.484031 
      drug22 |  -1.405081   .0134423  -104.53   0.000    -1.431433   -1.378729 
      drug23 |  -1.507983   .0122557  -123.04   0.000    -1.532009   -1.483957 
      drug24 |   .1684679   .0203503     8.28   0.000     .1285737    .2083621 
      drug25 |  -1.050998   .0171821   -61.17   0.000    -1.084682   -1.017315 
      drug26 |    -.98691   .0322818   -30.57   0.000    -1.050194   -.9236255 
      drug27 |  -1.176205   .0275606   -42.68   0.000    -1.230234   -1.122176 
      drug28 |  -1.999859   .0160892  -124.30   0.000      -2.0314   -1.968318 
      drug29 |  -4.555773   .0161725  -281.70   0.000    -4.587478   -4.524069 
      drug30 |   .5181748   .0132948    38.98   0.000     .4921119    .5442376 
      drug31 |  -3.144468   .0125315  -250.93   0.000    -3.169034   -3.119901 
      drug32 |  -2.913331   .0340726   -85.50   0.000    -2.980126   -2.846536 
      drug33 |  -2.939117   .0126288  -232.73   0.000    -2.963874    -2.91436 
      drug34 |  -4.136018   .0126961  -325.77   0.000    -4.160907   -4.111128 
      drug35 |   -4.52335   .0129248  -349.97   0.000    -4.548688   -4.498013 
      drug36 |  -.7350727   .0175793   -41.81   0.000    -.7695347   -.7006107 
      drug37 |  -.3138176   .0130839   -23.99   0.000     -.339467   -.2881682 
      drug38 |   2.333415   .3960793     5.89   0.000     1.556951     3.10988 
      drug39 |  -1.921175   .0299589   -64.13   0.000    -1.979906   -1.862444 
      drug40 |  -.0587317   .0199222    -2.95   0.003    -.0977867   -.0196766 
      drug41 |  -.9562732   .0121807   -78.51   0.000    -.9801519   -.9323944 
      drug42 |  -3.961262   .0125253  -316.26   0.000    -3.985816   -3.936707 
      drug43 |  -3.389328   .0134725  -251.57   0.000    -3.415739   -3.362917 
      drug44 |  -4.028348   .0115498  -348.78   0.000     -4.05099   -4.005706 
      drug45 |  -4.085555   .0185763  -219.93   0.000    -4.121972   -4.049138 
      drug46 |  -.6618385   .0174958   -37.83   0.000    -.6961368   -.6275402 
      drug47 |   .1908353   .0207812     9.18   0.000     .1500963    .2315742   34
      drug48 |  -4.210624   .0131619  -319.91   0.000    -4.236426   -4.184822 
      drug49 |   2.373011   .3007433     7.89   0.000     1.783441    2.962581 
      drug50 |  -2.534737   .0145965  -173.65   0.000    -2.563352   -2.506123 
      drug51 |  -1.523435   .0147558  -103.24   0.000    -1.552362   -1.494508 
      drug52 |   1.112289    .011611    95.80   0.000     1.089527    1.135051 
      drug53 |  -.5106332   .0121877   -41.90   0.000    -.5345257   -.4867407 
      drug54 |  -.5183452   .0151536   -34.21   0.000     -.548052   -.4886383 
      drug55 |  -2.828498   .0220224  -128.44   0.000     -2.87167   -2.785326 
      drug56 |   1.528136   .0367543    41.58   0.000     1.456084    1.600189 
      drug57 |  -1.251521   .0118013  -106.05   0.000    -1.274656   -1.228386 
      drug58 |   2.711862   .0138427   195.91   0.000     2.684725    2.738999 
      drug59 |   3.731509   .0125955   296.26   0.000     3.706817    3.756201 
      drug60 |   -4.70016   .0156604  -300.13   0.000     -4.73086    -4.66946 
      drug61 |  -3.293955   .0120981  -272.27   0.000    -3.317671   -3.270238 
      drug62 |  -3.302438   .0154613  -213.59   0.000    -3.332748   -3.272128 
      drug63 |  -.4202777    .011229   -37.43   0.000    -.4422908   -.3982645 
      drug64 |  -4.851241   .0141103  -343.81   0.000    -4.878902   -4.823579 
      drug65 |   2.728047   .0945052    28.87   0.000     2.542781    2.913313 
      drug66 |  -.7030711    .014791   -47.53   0.000    -.7320671   -.6740751 
      drug67 |   3.305774   .0748816    44.15   0.000     3.158978     3.45257 
      drug68 |  -.7331843   .0125502   -58.42   0.000    -.7577875   -.7085812 
      drug69 |  -3.470705   .0155486  -223.22   0.000    -3.501186   -3.440224 
      drug70 |  -.1642891   .1175132    -1.40   0.162    -.3946592     .066081 
      drug71 |  -1.841538   .0124017  -148.49   0.000     -1.86585   -1.817226 
      drug72 |  -.4704755   .0179335   -26.23   0.000    -.5056319   -.4353191 
      drug73 |   6.648656   .0417843   159.12   0.000     6.566743    6.730569 
      drug74 |   -2.43209   .0136364  -178.35   0.000    -2.458823   -2.405358 
      drug75 |  -2.057273   .0122463  -167.99   0.000     -2.08128   -2.033266 
      drug76 |  -3.618214   .0165023  -219.26   0.000    -3.650564   -3.585863 
      drug77 |   .1318634   .0173543     7.60   0.000     .0978425    .1658842 
      drug78 |   3.321118    .020179   164.58   0.000     3.281559    3.360676 
      drug79 |  -3.862918   .0128729  -300.08   0.000    -3.888153   -3.837682 
      drug80 |  -1.182712   .0115345  -102.54   0.000    -1.205323     -1.1601 
      drug81 |  -2.037566   .1068212   -19.07   0.000    -2.246976   -1.828156 
      drug82 |  -.2766855   .0167567   -16.51   0.000    -.3095348   -.2438361 
      drug83 |   2.256242   .1491733    15.12   0.000     1.963806    2.548678 
       _cons |  -1.632368     .01137  -143.57   0.000    -1.654658   -1.610079 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Model 2.3 
Model specification: 
      Drug markets with apparent measurement error removed 
      Indicators of one period lagged AG generic market share  
      Indicators of total number of generic drugs introduced 
      Drug market specific indicators 
      Quarter of year indicator variables dropped 
      Robust standard error estimator used 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    4919 
                                                       F( 78,  4839) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9981 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .11283 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
        lbap |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 laggshare20 |   .0756729   .0178476     4.24   0.000     .0406835    .1106624 
 laggshare40 |   .0238561   .0102227     2.33   0.020      .003815    .0438972 
 laggshare60 |  -.0166727   .0084813    -1.97   0.049    -.0332999   -.0000456 
 laggshare80 |  -.0133237   .0093263    -1.43   0.153    -.0316074      .00496 
laggshare100 |   .0143089   .0067084     2.13   0.033     .0011574    .0274604 
   ldtotgen1 |  -.0129131   .0064376    -2.01   0.045    -.0255336   -.0002925 
   ldtotgen2 |  -.0235389   .0082889    -2.84   0.005    -.0397889    -.007289 
   ldtotgen3 |  -.0164033   .0090347    -1.82   0.069    -.0341155    .0013089 
   ldtotgen4 |  -.0042068   .0109803    -0.38   0.702    -.0257332    .0173195 
   ldtotgen5 |  -.0295492   .0114328    -2.58   0.010    -.0519626   -.0071358 
   ldtotgen6 |  -.0289591   .0148404    -1.95   0.051     -.058053    .0001349 
   ldtotgen7 |  -.0019183   .0124794    -0.15   0.878    -.0263837    .0225471 
   ldtotgen8 |  -.0679157   .0171667    -3.96   0.000    -.1015702   -.0342611 
   ldtotgen9 |  -.0696698   .0185645    -3.75   0.000    -.1060647    -.033275 
  ldtotgen10 |  -.1486249   .0135951   -10.93   0.000    -.1752776   -.1219723 
  ldtotgen11 |  -.1557837   .0136431   -11.42   0.000    -.1825304    -.129037 
       drug2 |    3.43999   .0116159   296.15   0.000     3.417218    3.462762 
       drug3 |  -2.785868   .0116506  -239.12   0.000    -2.808709   -2.763028 
       drug4 |  (dropped) 
       drug5 |   4.178393   .0116119   359.84   0.000     4.155628    4.201158 
       drug6 |  -.5945569    .012515   -47.51   0.000     -.619092   -.5700217 
       drug7 |    4.77054   .0121567   392.42   0.000     4.746707    4.794373 
       drug8 |   2.792774   .0298692    93.50   0.000     2.734217    2.851331 
       drug9 |  -1.014878   .0187297   -54.19   0.000    -1.051597   -.9781592 
      drug10 |  -.4621227   .0129461   -35.70   0.000    -.4875029   -.4367425 
      drug11 |  -4.166495   .0162408  -256.54   0.000    -4.198334   -4.134655 
      drug12 |  -3.255568   .0114845  -283.48   0.000    -3.278082   -3.233053 
      drug13 |  (dropped) 
      drug14 |  -3.283397   .0111274  -295.07   0.000    -3.305212   -3.261583 
      drug15 |  (dropped) 
      drug16 |  -1.012263   .0119551   -84.67   0.000    -1.035701   -.9888261 
      drug17 |  -3.981256   .0152976  -260.25   0.000    -4.011247   -3.951266 
      drug18 |  (dropped) 
      drug19 |  -3.428771   .0169723  -202.02   0.000    -3.462045   -3.395498 
      drug20 |  (dropped) 
      drug21 |  (dropped) 
      drug22 |  -1.408704    .012745  -110.53   0.000     -1.43369   -1.383718 
      drug23 |  -1.508151   .0120366  -125.30   0.000    -1.531748   -1.484554 
      drug24 |   .1683176   .0200038     8.41   0.000     .1291012    .2075341 
      drug25 |  -1.057252   .0162659   -65.00   0.000    -1.089141   -1.025364 
      drug26 |  (dropped) 
      drug27 |  (dropped) 
      drug28 |  -1.999341   .0147253  -135.78   0.000    -2.028209   -1.970473 
      drug29 |  -4.555908   .0154598  -294.69   0.000    -4.586216     -4.5256 
      drug30 |   .5198893   .0130207    39.93   0.000     .4943627    .5454158 
      drug31 |  -3.145546   .0122775  -256.20   0.000    -3.169615   -3.121476 
      drug32 |  (dropped) 
      drug33 |   -2.94066   .0123224  -238.64   0.000    -2.964817   -2.916502 
      drug34 |  -4.130733   .0119245  -346.41   0.000     -4.15411   -4.107356 
      drug35 |  -4.523849    .012514  -361.50   0.000    -4.548383   -4.499316 
      drug36 |   -.732393    .016593   -44.14   0.000    -.7649228   -.6998632 
      drug37 |  -.3123926   .0126404   -24.71   0.000    -.3371736   -.2876116 
      drug38 |  (dropped) 
      drug39 |  (dropped) 
      drug40 |  -.0591285   .0195548    -3.02   0.003    -.0974648   -.0207921 
      drug41 |  -.9580241   .0118813   -80.63   0.000    -.9813169   -.9347313 
      drug42 |   -3.96134   .0119495  -331.51   0.000    -3.984767   -3.937914 
      drug43 |  -3.384157   .0126728  -267.04   0.000    -3.409001   -3.359312 
      drug44 |  -4.028499   .0113275  -355.64   0.000    -4.050706   -4.006292 
      drug45 |  -4.083764    .017866  -228.58   0.000     -4.11879   -4.048739 
      drug46 |  -.6470645   .0146014   -44.32   0.000      -.67569    -.618439 
      drug47 |  (dropped)   36
      drug48 |  -4.210715   .0124587  -337.97   0.000    -4.235139    -4.18629 
      drug49 |  (dropped) 
      drug50 |  -2.536578   .0144018  -176.13   0.000    -2.564812   -2.508344 
      drug51 |  (dropped) 
      drug52 |   1.110905   .0112006    99.18   0.000     1.088947    1.132864 
      drug53 |  -.5108256   .0115239   -44.33   0.000    -.5334178   -.4882334 
      drug54 |  -.5185916    .014643   -35.42   0.000    -.5472985   -.4898847 
      drug55 |  -2.829089   .0218694  -129.36   0.000    -2.871963   -2.786215 
      drug56 |   1.538604    .036154    42.56   0.000     1.467726    1.609483 
      drug57 |  -1.249777   .0114334  -109.31   0.000    -1.272192   -1.227363 
      drug58 |   2.710737    .013002   208.49   0.000     2.685248    2.736227 
      drug59 |   3.728449   .0121478   306.92   0.000     3.704634    3.752264 
      drug60 |  -4.688074   .0126809  -369.70   0.000    -4.712934   -4.663214 
      drug61 |  -3.295076   .0118356  -278.40   0.000     -3.31828   -3.271873 
      drug62 |  -3.291243   .0139743  -235.52   0.000    -3.318639   -3.263847 
      drug63 |  -.4214237   .0109231   -38.58   0.000    -.4428379   -.4000096 
      drug64 |  -4.848445   .0137098  -353.65   0.000    -4.875322   -4.821567 
      drug65 |   2.725683   .0939921    29.00   0.000     2.541416     2.90995 
      drug66 |  -.7043099    .014367   -49.02   0.000    -.7324757    -.676144 
      drug67 |  (dropped) 
      drug68 |  -.7346175   .0120173   -61.13   0.000    -.7581769   -.7110581 
      drug69 |  -3.473583   .0150818  -230.32   0.000     -3.50315   -3.444016 
      drug70 |  (dropped) 
      drug71 |  -1.845075   .0120302  -153.37   0.000    -1.868659    -1.82149 
      drug72 |  -.4683861   .0173672   -26.97   0.000    -.5024337   -.4343384 
      drug73 |   6.648635   .0415339   160.08   0.000      6.56721    6.730061 
      drug74 |  -2.429491   .0123522  -196.68   0.000    -2.453707   -2.405275 
      drug75 |  -2.058726   .0118078  -174.35   0.000    -2.081874   -2.035577 
      drug76 |  -3.604807   .0148759  -242.32   0.000     -3.63397   -3.575643 
      drug77 |  (dropped) 
      drug78 |   3.319938   .0200022   165.98   0.000     3.280724    3.359151 
      drug79 |  -3.863587    .012612  -306.34   0.000    -3.888312   -3.838862 
      drug80 |  -1.184198   .0110403  -107.26   0.000    -1.205842   -1.162554 
      drug81 |  (dropped) 
      drug82 |  -.2671934   .0153518   -17.40   0.000    -.2972898    -.237097 
      drug83 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |  -1.630881   .0108685  -150.06   0.000    -1.652189   -1.609574 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Model 2.4 
Model specification: 
      Drug markets with apparent measurement error removed 
      Indicators of contemporaneous AG generic market share  
      Indicators of total number of generic drugs introduced 
      Drug market specific indicators 
      Quarter of year indicator variables dropped 
      Robust standard error estimator used 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    4919 
                                                       F( 78,  4839) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9981 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .11278 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
        lbap |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  aggshare20 |   .0786967   .0178285     4.41   0.000     .0437449    .1136486 
  aggshare40 |   .0273265   .0101583     2.69   0.007     .0074117    .0472413 
  aggshare60 |  -.0151976   .0085613    -1.78   0.076    -.0319817    .0015865 
  aggshare80 |  -.0029807   .0092351    -0.32   0.747    -.0210857    .0151244 
 aggshare100 |   .0085505   .0060746     1.41   0.159    -.0033584    .0204595 
   ldtotgen1 |  -.0137173   .0064977    -2.11   0.035    -.0264558   -.0009788 
   ldtotgen2 |  -.0257415   .0083336    -3.09   0.002    -.0420791   -.0094038 
   ldtotgen3 |  -.0190002   .0090727    -2.09   0.036    -.0367868   -.0012136 
   ldtotgen4 |  -.0078155   .0110741    -0.71   0.480    -.0295258    .0138948 
   ldtotgen5 |  -.0332709   .0115262    -2.89   0.004    -.0558676   -.0106742 
   ldtotgen6 |  -.0326297   .0149438    -2.18   0.029    -.0619264   -.0033331 
   ldtotgen7 |  -.0045479   .0124976    -0.36   0.716    -.0290488     .019953 
   ldtotgen8 |   -.072115   .0175386    -4.11   0.000    -.1064985   -.0377314 
   ldtotgen9 |   -.071189   .0184343    -3.86   0.000    -.1073286   -.0350494 
  ldtotgen10 |  -.1492701   .0135273   -11.03   0.000    -.1757897   -.1227505 
  ldtotgen11 |  -.1564288   .0135755   -11.52   0.000     -.183043   -.1298147 
       drug2 |    3.43938   .0115862   296.85   0.000     3.416665    3.462094 
       drug3 |  -2.786948   .0116046  -240.16   0.000    -2.809699   -2.764198 
       drug4 |  (dropped) 
       drug5 |   4.178648   .0115802   360.84   0.000     4.155945    4.201351 
       drug6 |  -.5945404   .0124973   -47.57   0.000    -.6190409   -.5700399 
       drug7 |    4.77208    .012129   393.44   0.000     4.748302    4.795859 
       drug8 |   2.793428   .0299033    93.42   0.000     2.734804    2.852052 
       drug9 |  -1.012869    .018719   -54.11   0.000    -1.049567   -.9761711 
      drug10 |  -.4618743   .0128872   -35.84   0.000    -.4871391   -.4366095 
      drug11 |  -4.167593    .016176  -257.64   0.000    -4.199305    -4.13588 
      drug12 |  -3.256039   .0114532  -284.29   0.000    -3.278492   -3.233585 
      drug13 |  (dropped) 
      drug14 |  -3.284561   .0111003  -295.90   0.000    -3.306322   -3.262799 
      drug15 |  (dropped) 
      drug16 |   -1.01364   .0120247   -84.30   0.000    -1.037213   -.9900656 
      drug17 |  -3.983351   .0154049  -258.58   0.000    -4.013552    -3.95315 
      drug18 |  (dropped) 
      drug19 |  -3.428582    .016972  -202.01   0.000    -3.461855   -3.395309 
      drug20 |  (dropped) 
      drug21 |  (dropped) 
      drug22 |  -1.410682   .0127428  -110.70   0.000    -1.435664     -1.3857 
      drug23 |  -1.508168   .0120007  -125.67   0.000    -1.531695   -1.484641 
      drug24 |   .1684294   .0200017     8.42   0.000      .129217    .2076418 
      drug25 |  -1.054527   .0162051   -65.07   0.000    -1.086296   -1.022758 
      drug26 |  (dropped) 
      drug27 |  (dropped) 
      drug28 |  -1.999039   .0146987  -136.00   0.000    -2.027855   -1.970223 
      drug29 |  -4.556236   .0154942  -294.06   0.000    -4.586612   -4.525861 
      drug30 |   .5196418   .0130281    39.89   0.000     .4941008    .5451827 
      drug31 |  -3.145698   .0122416  -256.97   0.000    -3.169697   -3.121699 
      drug32 |  (dropped) 
      drug33 |  -2.942223   .0123201  -238.81   0.000    -2.966376    -2.91807 
      drug34 |  -4.130178    .011909  -346.81   0.000    -4.153525   -4.106831 
      drug35 |  -4.523837   .0124671  -362.86   0.000    -4.548278   -4.499396 
      drug36 |  -.7332619    .016628   -44.10   0.000    -.7658604   -.7006634 
      drug37 |  -.3135471   .0126824   -24.72   0.000    -.3384102   -.2886839 
      drug38 |  (dropped) 
      drug39 |  (dropped) 
      drug40 |  -.0590867    .019509    -3.03   0.002    -.0973333   -.0208402 
      drug41 |  -.9593793   .0119244   -80.46   0.000    -.9827566   -.9360021 
      drug42 |  -3.960946   .0118898  -333.14   0.000    -3.984255   -3.937637 
      drug43 |  -3.387587   .0127182  -266.36   0.000     -3.41252   -3.362653 
      drug44 |  -4.028484   .0112973  -356.59   0.000    -4.050632   -4.006336 
      drug45 |   -4.08344   .0177896  -229.54   0.000    -4.118316   -4.048564 
      drug46 |  -.6452372   .0145906   -44.22   0.000    -.6738414   -.6166331 
      drug47 |  (dropped)   38
      drug48 |  -4.210586   .0124284  -338.79   0.000    -4.234951    -4.18622 
      drug49 |  (dropped) 
      drug50 |   -2.53818   .0144221  -175.99   0.000    -2.566454   -2.509906 
      drug51 |  (dropped) 
      drug52 |   1.110666   .0111598    99.52   0.000     1.088788    1.132544 
      drug53 |  -.5107257   .0114848   -44.47   0.000    -.5332412   -.4882103 
      drug54 |  -.5205542   .0148523   -35.05   0.000    -.5496713    -.491437 
      drug55 |  -2.829102   .0218629  -129.40   0.000    -2.871963   -2.786241 
      drug56 |    1.54077   .0362169    42.54   0.000     1.469768    1.611771 
      drug57 |  -1.249547   .0113895  -109.71   0.000    -1.271875   -1.227218 
      drug58 |   2.710042   .0129813   208.76   0.000     2.684593    2.735492 
      drug59 |   3.728328   .0121185   307.66   0.000      3.70457    3.752086 
      drug60 |  -4.686283   .0126601  -370.16   0.000    -4.711103   -4.661464 
      drug61 |  -3.297348   .0117804  -279.90   0.000    -3.320443   -3.274253 
      drug62 |   -3.28866   .0139798  -235.24   0.000    -3.316066   -3.261253 
      drug63 |  -.4215952   .0108812   -38.75   0.000    -.4429274    -.400263 
      drug64 |  -4.848051   .0136785  -354.43   0.000    -4.874867   -4.821235 
      drug65 |   2.723817   .0937909    29.04   0.000     2.539944     2.90769 
      drug66 |  -.7050047   .0143435   -49.15   0.000    -.7331246   -.6768849 
      drug67 |  (dropped) 
      drug68 |  -.7354118   .0119952   -61.31   0.000    -.7589278   -.7118958 
      drug69 |  -3.475145   .0149888  -231.85   0.000     -3.50453    -3.44576 
      drug70 |  (dropped) 
      drug71 |  -1.847103   .0120418  -153.39   0.000     -1.87071   -1.823495 
      drug72 |  -.4680093   .0172819   -27.08   0.000    -.5018896    -.434129 
      drug73 |   6.648784    .041529   160.10   0.000     6.567368      6.7302 
      drug74 |   -2.42986   .0122881  -197.74   0.000     -2.45395   -2.405769 
      drug75 |  -2.058984   .0117681  -174.96   0.000    -2.082055   -2.035913 
      drug76 |  -3.602403   .0148933  -241.88   0.000    -3.631601   -3.573206 
      drug77 |  (dropped) 
      drug78 |   3.319756   .0199801   166.15   0.000     3.280586    3.358927 
      drug79 |  -3.863623   .0125847  -307.01   0.000    -3.888294   -3.838951 
      drug80 |  -1.184467   .0109976  -107.70   0.000    -1.206027   -1.162906 
      drug81 |  (dropped) 
      drug82 |  -.2660906   .0152957   -17.40   0.000    -.2960771   -.2361041 
      drug83 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |  -1.630613   .0108252  -150.63   0.000    -1.651835   -1.609391 
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